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ABSTRACT
Collaborative Caching for Efficient and Robust Certificate 
Authority Services in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Laith A. Al-Sulaiman 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Hussein Abdel-Wahab
Security in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) is getting a lot of attention due to its 
inherent vulnerability to a wide spectrum of attacks. Threats exist in every layer of 
MANET stack, and different solutions have been adapted for each security problem. 
Additionally, availability is an important criterion in most MANET solutions, but many 
security frameworks did not consider it. Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is no exception, 
and its deployment in MANET needs major design and implementation modifications 
that can fit constraints unique to this environment. Our focus in this dissertation is to 
adapt and increase the availability of Certificate Authority (CA) services, as a major PKI 
entity, in MANET.
Several attempts have been proposed to deal with the problem of deploying CA in 
MANET to provide a generic public-key framework, but each either ends up sacrificing 
system security or availability. Here, the main goal of our work is to provide a solution 
that addresses performance and security issues of providing MANET-based PKI. 
Particularly, we would like to maintain the availability of the services provided by CA 
while keeping the network's packet overhead as low as possible.
In this dissertation, we present a MANET-based framework suitable for 
exchanging public-key certificates by collaborative caching between MANET clients. We 
show that our system can meet the challenges of providing robust and secure CA services 
in MANET. Augmented by simulation results, we demonstrate quantitatively the 
feasibility of our work as we were able to reduce network overhead associated with
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
threshold based CA queries up to 92% as compared to related work in addition to having 
a very short response time. The dependency on CA servers has been reduced, and the 
system was able to tolerate as much as two-third inoperative CA servers without 
noticeable decrease in the service performance.
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Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) applications and services pose many interesting 
challenges due to the unique features of MANET environment. More specifically, 
MANET security is getting a lot o f attention due to its inherent vulnerability to attacks. 
Threats exist in every layer of MANET stack, and different solutions have been adapted 
for each security problem. Another problem for MANET is availability, but adding more 
resources will not necessarily make the system more available. One important problem is 
how to provide a security framework that could be utilized in different MANET protocols 
and applications. One way of providing a generic, security-based framework is to deploy 
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, PKI deployment in MANET needs to be 
designed and tailored carefully to comply with MANET. More specifically, the focus of 
our discussion is how to adapt the Certificate Authority (CA), which is a major PKI 
entity, in MANET.
Several attempts have been made to tackle the problem of providing a generic 
public-key framework, but each either ends up sacrificing system security or availability. 
Here, the main goal o f our work is to provide a solution that addresses performance and 
security issues of providing MANET-based PKI. Particularly, we would like to increase 
the availability of the services provided by CA component while lowering the packet 
overhead of the network without increasing network vulnerability.
In this dissertation, we present a framework suitable for exchanging public-key 
certificates in MANET based on collaborative caching between network clients. We will 
show that our system can meet the challenges of providing robust and secure CA services 
in such harsh environment. Supported by simulation results, we will also demonstrate 
quantitatively the feasibility of our work as compared to other related research which has
The journal model for this dissertation is the IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
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addressed the same problem. In this thesis, the terms framework, system, service, and 
protocol are used interchangeably. The term "Principal" will be used to refer to an entity 
involved in cryptographically protected communication (e.g. human or machine).
This section is organized as follows: Section 1.1 is a general overview of our 
work. Section 1.2 presents the motivation and objectives for our work while Section 1.3 
is a summary of our results and contributions. Finally, Section 1.4 is the outline of this 
dissertation.
1.1. Overview
MANET is raising many interesting challenges for applications and services due to its 
unique characteristics. Not relying on fixed infrastructure combined with tight 
constraints, such as power consumption, transmission range, and possibly computational 
capabilities, are just a few examples of such challenges.
Security, on the other hand, is as crucial as other challenges and has received 
much attention from researchers in every aspect of MANET due to its inherent 
vulnerability to wider security attacks compared to wired networks. Assuming that nodes 
will be safe from physical attacks is no longer a realistic assumption, not to mention other 
diverse threats such as spectrum jamming, disruption of routing messages, denial of 
service, and eavesdropping (e.g.[41], [73], [57], [28]).
Availability is another significant problem, and as an important dimension of 
Quality of Service (QoS), has been addressed in MANET from a variety o f perspectives 
(e.g. [14], [27], [45]). Unfortunately, availability cannot be guaranteed by just adding 
more resources without careful planning. Naively adding more resources may have 
adverse effect like increasing the overhead of the system or exposing its security.
MANET requires solutions that consider its unique characteristics. Thus, 
solutions designed for wired networks cannot be ported transparently because, simply, 
many of them have been proposed under the assumption of good connectivity and no 
mobility, which means a low link failure between nodes.
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Another problem in MANET is adapting security frameworks to protect various 
components of MANET stack. Various public-key based solutions such as [5], [30] seem 
to be good candidates, but they are too expensive to be practically deployed unless we 
redesign them using a MANET-centric approach. A typical PKI system consists of 
certificates, a CA, a revocation mechanism, and a mechanism to evaluate a chain of 
certificates to the target [41]. Public/private-keys can be used for encrypting and/or 
signing in many vital modules and applications, such as authentication, secure exchange 
of routing information, encrypting or signing emails, and much more. A CA is usually 
used to organize, store, and issue certificates that associate a public-key to an identity.
As we can see, PKI has been used and implemented in wired networks and, in 
principle, could be used to provide security for MANET as well. However, implementing 
PKI in MANET is not an easy task since current PKI solutions are conceptually designed 
for centralized, wired, and well-connected networks. The unique features of MANET 
makes the task of providing a reliable and secure service much more difficult.
A direct solution like installing a single CA server per MANET will make it very 
vulnerable and, in fact, will create a single point o f failure. Moreover, replication of the 
CA could increase robustness but would make the situation even worse, compared to the 
single CA solution, by exposing the system and giving the attacker more choices.
Recently, researchers have tried to solve the dilemma of security and availability 
and provided some solutions to adapt CA services to MANET. These solutions rely on 
secret sharing concepts and mechanisms (e.g. [25], [39], [66], [26]) to increase system 
security and availability. Conceptually, secret sharing is a mechanism of distributing a 
secret (e.g. key) between multiple, say n , parties in a way such that any t (also called 
"threshold" where 1 < t < n ) parties can reveal the secret. This means that if  less than t 
parties have been compromised, the secret is still safe. When t = 1, it means the system is 
more available since any one out of n could be contacted, and when t = n , it means the 
system is highly secure since an attacker needs to compromise all the nodes to gain the 
secret. However, the system may lose its robustness since compromising a single node 
will put the system out of service. Thus, t is the balance point between availability and
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security. On the bright side, secret sharing could be a natural fit for MANET; however, it 
cannot be deployed without consequences, as we will see later in this dissertation.
The first attempt to adapt CA service based on secret sharing techniques to 
MANET was by Hass and Zhou [73]. They sketched an elegant solution based on Cornell 
Online Certificate Authority (COCA) as a foundation for a pervasive CA service in 
MANET. The novelty was to use threshold cryptography to securely distribute the 
private-key of the service over multiple servers. Each server has part of the CA service 
private-key, and it must collaborate with at least t — 1 other servers to provide security 
services such as signing and/or updating certificates. When a client wants to use the 
service it will contact a predetermined CA server called the "delegate." The delegate will 
contact t — 1 CAs passing the request to them and wait for their partial signature for the 
certificate in question. After collecting the replies, the delegate will reconstruct the 
certificate and send it back to the client.
Inspired by COCA, Mobile CA (MOCA) [70] has been introduced as a candidate 
for providing CA services in MANET but with more consideration to its unique 
properties since COCA was originally designed for wired networks and did not consider 
client connectivity. MOCA consists of mobile nodes within a MANET selected to 
provide distributed CA functionality. MOCA nodes apply threshold cryptography to 
share the responsibility and increase the availability of the service. Client nodes need to 
contact sufficient MOCAs to get the service. When a client wishes to get a certificate, it 
sends request packets to at least t MOCA servers and waits for a reply. Any MOCA that 
receives a request will answer by sending a reply that contains its partial signature for the 
subject in question. The client needs to receive at least t valid replies and combine them 
to reconstruct the whole certificate. Usually, MOCA clients will send more than t unicast 
requests to increase protocol robustness.
Another proposal, Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA), was 
suggested by Kong et al. [43], and their goal was to provide pervasive CA services by 
making all n nodes in the network share CA functionality. However, since sharing the 
private-key by all participants is obviously unfeasible, especially in MANET, Kong’s
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scheme was to distribute the service private-key into every coalition of nodes, where each 
coalition has at least t nodes, and they are one hop apart such that a client needs only to 
contact t instead of n nodes by sending a local broadcast request to obtain service. Once 
a certificate is issued, it is trusted by the whole network since it has been signed by the 
same private-key. Thus, a well-defined issuing policy is needed to control certificate 
issuing.
Hubaux el al.[36] suggested a scheme similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
scheme [41] in which there is no concept of centralized CA and each node acts as its own 
CA. Every node will build its own "Web of Trust;" thus, there is no longer a well known 
trusted third party, as in the case of conventional PKI.
1.2. Motivation and Objectives
In the previous section, we showed various approaches that consider solving key 
management problems associated with MANET. We think that they all share the 
shortcoming of favoring security against availability or vise versa.
Zhou and Haas [73] introduced a novel concept of providing a robust CA service 
by disseminating the key over several servers using threshold cryptographic techniques. 
Although their work addressed security and fault tolerance issues, the scheme is 
conceptual, and the connectivity between clients and CA servers has not been addressed. 
Yi and Kravets [70] extended COCA concepts and have provided detailed performance 
evaluation to their work and compare it to their earlier prototype which is based on pure 
flooding [71]. The performance criteria for evaluating MOCA was to measure the ratio of 
certificate requests and reply messages over the total messages obtained when pure 
flooding is used. The MOCA scheme was 5-30% more efficient than pure flooding in 
terms of packet overhead. On the other hand, the URSA [43] scheme has solved the 
problem of availability by allowing any t nodes to sign certificates, assuming that at least 
t one-hop neighbors are available. As a consequence, they made t small to guarantee 
availability, system security is sacrificed. The Hubaux [36] solution is suitable for small 
self-organized networks in which every node builds its own trust relations, and it has the
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shortcoming of scalability and the lack of a definite trust anchor (i.e. CA) which is trusted 
automatically by definition. Moreover, the framework does not use threshold 
cryptography, but we mention it to complete our coverage o f the subject. We are going to 
elaborate more on the abovementioned work in Section 3.
We believe that there is room for improvement, and such enhancements could be 
accomplished by trying to make CA services have better performance while enjoying 
similar security. Here, we are presenting our work, CACMAN, which stands for 
"CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks;" and the objective o f this work could 
be stated as follows:
The aim o f CACMAN is to minimize the burden o f  adapting CA services 
in MANET and reduce packet overhead while maintaining high 
availability o f  the service without compromising its security.
This goal has been reached by allowing clients to share some responsibilities with 
CA servers by cooperatively caching portions of the certificates generated by CA servers. 
The characteristics of certificates, such as relatively long validity periods and modest 
storage requirements, can make caching a reasonable solution to reduce the burden of 
offering highly available and secure services by relieving CA servers from some of their 
duties. Our cashing-based framework has addressed the security and performance 
challenges of providing CA services in MANET.
1.3. Methodology, Result, and Contribution
CACMAN can be viewed as a hybrid between URSA and MOCA that boasts the best of 
both worlds, i.e. the availability of the former and the security of the latter. Such fusion, 
supported with novel techniques, shows CACMAN's strength. We chose adhering to 
secret sharing principles to reach our objective, and we have provided quantitative 
measurements showing how CACMAN contribute to solving the aforementioned 
problems. Network simulator NS-2 [47] is been used to implement CACMAN and 
enabled us to evaluate the significant of various parameters in relation to our objectives.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
7
CACMAN have two major operations: Certificate Request (CREQ) and 
Certificate Reply (CREP). Any client that wants to obtain another principal's certificate 
will search its own cache to see if it has this certificate; otherwise, it will identify the 
missing partial certificates and proceed by sending CREQ by local broadcast. Every 
CACMAN client that receives a CREQ message inspects its cache for a possible hit, and 
a CREP is sent back to the requester if a full or partial certificate(s) is found for the 
subject. After that, the client waits for a specified time; if  it receives sufficient responses, 
then it reconstructs the certificate. If the requester times out because it has not received 
sufficient partials, or the reconstruction step has failed, then it may try to contact CA 
servers by flooding the network or by sending unicast messages. Otherwise, it reports a 
failure to the client or retries later.
The novelty of CACMAN is based on the concept o f applying caching techniques 
to boost the performance of CA service. We proposed and implemented several 
techniques starting with "CACMAN-basic" model and extending it to "CACMAN X- 
Replies," "CACMAN Lazy-Replies with Cancellation," and "Cache-Focus" variants. 
Those techniques and enhancements vary in their requirements, assumptions, overhead, 
and tradeoffs. Every proposed technique is supported by NS-2 simulation results. We also 
show the consequences of implementing revocation schemes in our work and discuss 
different design and deployment issues.
We can summarize our contributions in this dissertation into the following main
points:
1) Reducing Network Overhead. CACMAN is able to achieve a significant 
reduction of packet overhead which varies with every configuration between 
74% and 91% as compared to other related protocols.
2) Reducing Servers' Overhead: Simulation results show significant decrease on 
CA servers' load which enabled us to achieve the following desired goals:
a. Fewer Requests per CA : This was due to clients' contribution in which 
they took part of CA responsibilities and volunteered portions of their
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memory to cache certificates. CA load has been reduced dramatically 
compared to MOCA and flooding.
b. Allowing more Offline Time: In CACMAN, a CA server is no longer 
required to be online to provide a continuous service and it can go 
offline for maintenance or to reduce its physical exposure to threats.
3) Separating Availability from  Security: the value of t in a threshold-based 
secret-sharing system controls the two aspects of the system which we want to 
keep as high as possible. Unfortunately, they are inversely proportional (i.e. 
availability vs. security). In CACMAN, we are able to make balance 
availability and security.
4) Maintaining High Availability. CACMAN allows service to be up most of the 
time, even if  most of the CA servers are destroyed (we simulated the scenario 
where 20 out of 30 CA were damaged) without noticeable degradation of 
performance.
5) Reducing Response Time: Our framework is able to achieve higher response 
time, up to 16 times faster, than other related frameworks based on our 
simulation results.
6) Obeying Security Requirements: In CACMAN, we obeyed most of the 
security assumptions of related work, such as threshold concepts.
Table I shows how CACMAN can maintain a high success ratio for certificate requests 
with much lower packet overhead as compared to MOCA (reported in the first row). 
Notice that while success rates are comparable to MOCA, network traffic overhead is 
reduced.
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T a b l e  I
S a m p le  v a l u e s  f o r  C A C M A N  c o m p a r e d  t o  r e l a t e d  w o r k  ( t  -  1 5 )
Model Ratio to flooding
Success Ratio
MOCA Closest unicast 86.2% 77%
1 CACMAN basic, 150 cache size 9.7% 63.3%
CACMAN all-reps, 150 cache size 14.7% 78.9%
I CACMAN basic, 225 cache size 11.1% 73.9%
1 CACMAN all-reps, 225 cache size 20% 89%
1.4. Dissertation Outline
The organization of the dissertation is as follows: In Section 2, the necessary background 
that covers MANET security essentials and basics is given. It starts by discussing 
Public/Private-key cryptography and how it differs from conventional methods. The PKI 
that governs key deployment and management is also discussed with some focus on 
validation and revoking schemes. A mathematical overview of how to share a key 
between multiple parties is presented with more description on how to make it more 
practical and robust. The section also introduces some characteristics and challenges of 
MANET followed by a closer look at routing challenges. Then, the focus is on various 
MANET specific security challenges, like availability, routing, intrusion detection, and 
key management. Section 3 gives more attention to various key management schemes 
and discusses related work (e.g. URSA, COCA, and MOCA). Section 4 is devoted to our 
proposed solution, CACMAN, from a design perspective . It begins with a detailed 
description of our framework followed by its assumptions. Protocol description is given 
followed by a discussion of alternative ways of communication. Various enhancements to 
CACMAN are presented, followed by a discussion of the impact o f applying different 
revocation schemes. The section continues with a discussion of other miscellaneous 
issues that affect the implementation of the framework, followed by sketches of practical 
deployment scenarios. Section 5 compares CACMAN performance to related work. It 
begins by describing the simulation environment and how we conducted the experiments 
followed by simulation assumptions. The results of simulating various CACMAN 
enhancements and other configurations are visualized and tabulated accompanied by a
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detailed analysis. Section 6 contains the conclusion and possibilities for future work. This 
thesis also contains appendices that show further details and other aspects of our work. 
Appendix A contains an overview of the simulation environment used to implement 
CACMAN. Appendix B contains the implementation information for CACMAN. 
Although it can be presented as a separate section, we preferred to move the design and 
implementation details to appendices as it does not affect the basic understanding of the 
work.




This section is a presentation of some preliminary background. It will cover three general 
areas: security related background, MANET overview, their fusion, MANET security.
Security in MANET has received a lot of attention and the problem is clearly so 
broad that it is difficult to reach a single general solution. Thus, each proposal addresses 
the issue from a different perspective accompanied by different assumptions. Solutions 
are diverse as they focus on various aspects of MANET stack targeting application, end- 
to-end, routing, or MAC level security problems.
The organization of this section will be as follows: Section 2.1 is a cryptography 
introduction. Section 2.2 is a general overview of Public-key Infrastructure (PKI). In 
Section 2.3, we will focus on certificate revocation mechanisms. Section 2.4 is a brief 
background of secret sharing. Section 2.5 is dedicated to showing how to use secret 
sharing practically to do cryptographic operations. Section 2.6 is a general overview of 
MANET. Section 2.7 will cover general security problems faced in MANET, and Section 
2.8 is a summary.
2.1. Public-Key Cryptography
Cryptographic functions are categorized into three types: secret key functions, public-key 
functions, and hash functions [41]. The difference among these functions is represented 
in Fig. 1. In this section, we will refer to pubic/private-key cryptography more often than 
other schemes; thus, we will cover a few more details about it. Usually, each principal 
has two pairs of keys, i.e. public and private. The public-key, as the name reflects, is 
known by others, and the private-key is known only to its owner. When someone wants 
to send an encrypted message so that no one other than the receiver can view it, the 
sender will use the public-key of the receiver to encrypt the message. For the principal to 
decrypt the message, it should use its private-key to decrypt it.
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Plaintext encryption Ciphertext
“Hello World” I  “#$@ % !#$% A#*
(a) S ecret Key « ey
Ciphertext f  ^  Plaintext
“# $ @ % ! # $ % A# * ” decryption  ^  “Hello World”
Plaintext encryption  Ciphertext





“# $ @ %  ! # $ % A# * ” decryption  “Hello World”
Plaintext hashing ^  Digest
“Hello World” “#$@ % !#$% A#*”
(c) Hashing
Fig. 1. (a) Secret key crypto (also known as symmetric key cryptography), (b) public/private cryptography 
(also known as asymmetric cryptography), (c) Hash function.
Public/Private-key cryptography has interesting properties which broaden its 
usability and applications. When a principal applies its own private-key to a message, 
other principal could verify that the message has not been changed by applying the 
public-key of the former which will lead to the original message. This operation is called 
signing and is very useful for proving integrity. Public-key cryptography is based on 
modular exponentiation. Without getting into its mathematical details, we will describe 
how the famous public/private cryptographic scheme RSA [41] works. First, we choose 
two large prime numbers p  and q then multiply them to get n (i.e. n = pq) .  To generate 
the public-key, we choose a number e that is relatively prime to (f>{n) where 
t/>(n) = (p -  \){q - 1). Now the public key is (e,«) and the private-key is the multiplicative 
inverse of emod tf){n) , denoted as (d,n) . To get the ciphertext c for the plaintext m , we
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do m e = c.  To decrypt the message, we just need to cd = m.  This works because 
cd = (m e)d = ml = m .
2.2. Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a mechanism that offers the necessary components to 
generate, distribute, and control public-keys securely and confidentially (e.g. [5], [6]).
An ideal PKI [41] consists of the following components:
1) Certificates: A certificate is a digitally signed statement binding the key- 
holder's (i.e. principal's) name to a public-key issued by a trusted entity. 
However, the notion of a certificate has been expanded to include attributes 
other than key-holder such as nickname, email, account number, address, 
photo, or a combination of any other attributes [64],
2) Certificates Authority (CA): This is a repository and trusted entity that issues 
and signs certificates. The public-key of the CA is known and trusted by all 
nodes so that a node can verify any signed certificate issued by that CA. 
Certificates can be stored in any convenient location, such as the directory 
service [41].
3) Revoking Scheme: In some occasions, valid certificates need to be revoked 
due to business and/or security reasons. Usually revoked certificates are 
published in Certificate Revocation List (CRL). There exist some disputes 
against CRL and this was a point of controversy [64] [48], However, CRL is 
still used widely in various PKI implementations.
4) Certificate Evaluating Method: This is an evaluation scheme to validate a 
certificate chain of public-keys in advance that are known and trusted by their 
target name [41].
Even though some deployed PKI systems may leave out some components such 
as revocation, they are still called PKI systems, and this will not affect this discussion.
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2.3. Dissemination of Revoking Information: CRL and Validation 
Schemes
Usually, every certificate has an expiration date that varies between few minutes to few 
years. On some occasions, it is necessary to revoke an unexpired certificate. If a 
principal's private-key is exposed, the principal is no longer under the administration 
domain of a given CA, or some of the certificate properties associated to that principal 
need to be changed are some examples that necessitates existence o f a revocation 
mechanism.
CRL is a signed list of revoked unexpired certificates [41]. This list is distributed 
periodically to interested principals. CRL is a negative statement about the validity of the 
certificates it contains and, hence, any certificate that is not in the CRL is considered 
valid (a double negative). The problem of efficiently distrusting CRL has been addressed 
by researchers (e.g. [49],[52]). CRL could be eliminated by introducing a component 
dedicated to answering queries regarding certificates status.
The following list briefly illustrates the most common CRL distribution and 
certificates validation mechanisms:
1) Basic CRL: CA issues a list containing the serial numbers o f revoked but 
unexpired certificates which contains the next issuance date. All revoked 
unexpired certificates will be listed again when the time of the next issuance 
occurs.
2) Delta CRL: This was introduced to reduce the bandwidth and redundancy 
associated with sending a complete list every time an update occurs. Instead, a 
delta CRL contains the changes from the last baseline CRL. Therefore, it is 
usually short and often contains no certificates [41].
3) First Valid Certificate: The scheme goal, again, is to make the CRL as small 
as possible and to allow certificates not to have a predetermined expiration 
time when issued. When the size of the CRL becomes too large, the CA will 
issue a notice requesting any principal which holds a certificate with a serial
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number less than n to reissue a new certificate within some time from the date 
of that notice. The number n is chosen in a manner that only few serial 
numbers in the current CRL are greater than n. Revoked certificates with 
serial numbers greater than n must continue to appear in the new CRL [41].
4) Online Revocation Server [4] (OLRS): An OLRS could be a dedicated server 
that can be queried to check the validity of individual certificates. Typically, 
the verifier will query OLRS to check the status of the certificate in question 
online. However, if the OLRS is compromised, the worst the adversary could 
do is to revoke some valid certificates, given that the OLRS and CA use 
different keys. A scheme proposed by Micali [49] overcomes the 
shortcomings found in OLRS caused by cryptographic overhead by using the 
public-key every time a status reply is issued.
5) Recertification: Mukkamala et al. [52] present a technique to increase the 
validity of certificates without increasing the burden of revocation by 
introducing another entity called Recertification Authority (RCA). The CA 
issues a certificate with a long validity period; however, the principal is 
required to recertify at certain intervals from the RCA. This technique will 
prevent the CA from reissuing short-lived certificates.
6) Counter Certificate: In situations where revocation is a rare event, the CA 
could sign a counter certificate to revoke another certificate. However, the 
counter certificate should be made known to all interested parties.
2.4. Secret Sharing
Secret sharing (n,t) ,  first indicated by Shamir [66], is a set of n random shares for a 
secret s such that it is possible to reconstruct s by the knowledge of t shares where 
t < n . Moreover, nothing could be derived about s' by the knowledge of less than t 
shares.
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Shamir's scheme is based on polynomial interpolation. Given t points in the 2- 
dimentional plane (xi,y j): i e {1,..,?} andx/s are distinct, there exists one and only one 
polynomial p(x) of degree t -1  such that p (x i) = y t for all i . Thus, if  we pick a random 
polynomial p{x) = a0 + axx + ...at^x'~x which has the degree t - 1 and we assignor,, -  s ,  
and evaluate: q{l) = sl ,...,q{i) = st,...,q{n) = sn. By interpolation, we can find the 
coefficients of p{x) and evaluate s = p{0) to retrieve the secret. Knowing t -1  or less is 
not sufficient to calculates .
2.5. Threshold Cryptography and Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS)
In the previous section, we showed the basic scheme for secret sharing. However, 
sometimes it is desirable to hide s even from the principals (e.g. servers) themselves. Y. 
Desmedt [26] showed how threshold cryptography can be used to perform cryptographic 
operations such as signing or decrypting a message without exposing the private-key of 
the service.
Here, we will give an example illustrated by Desmedt [26] to share RSA such that 
t servers can sign messages independently and then the combiner will obtain the 
complete signed message from those partially signed messages.
As a reminder, a cryptosystem is represented by a function that takes two inputs, 
key and message, and the key provided as parameter, e.g. f kev {input) . In this example, it
is more convenient to make the key as an input so we have
fkey {input) = g input {key) , (1)
where /  and g  are cryptographic functions.
An important property for a threshold cryptographic function to be shared 
practically is to be homomorphic, i .e .,
g b(k\ +k2) = gb(ki)* g b(k2 )’ (2)
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where kx, k2 are keys and b is input.
Therefore, signing in RSA scheme will have g b(d) = bd m odn, where b is 
typically the digest of the message, d  is the private-key, and n is the public modulus.
Since RSA secret sharing scheme is homomorphic, we have
key = B)-(share,), (3)
ieB
where B  is a subset of the participants such that \B\ = t and Ct B is constant.
Thus, using (3) and (2) we have:
ieB
ieB
^  c (4)
ieB
= n ^ > c-
ieB
As we have seen in (4), a server that holds a share d x will sign a message using its 
partial-key and sends the results with its identity (i.e., i)  to the combiner. If the combiner 
has received sufficient responses (i.e.t), and by knowing CiB, the combiner will use (4)
to sign or decrypt the message.
Another issue that should be considered in threshold secret sharing schemes is 
robustness against the case of one or more shareholders sending erroneous partial results. 
Again, as Desmedt [26] has pointed out in his survey paper, some schemes can be used to 
recover/discover erroneous results without exhaustive search.
Threshold secret sharing has some desirable properties [43] in MANET which 
make their combination worth noting:
1) Distributed Control and Security: A  key feature in MANET is the absence of 
centralized control and the distribution of system management of the system is
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consistent with the nature of MANET. To satisfy the ubiquitous nature of 
MANET, distributing the secret to various nodes would increase availability.
2) Security vs1. Availability: The threshold t is the balance point between service 
availability and security. An adversary group must destroy n - t  + l share 
holders to turn off certification services, and break t servers to steal the 
secret.
Elowever, secret sharing by itself does not defend against mobile adversaries 
[74],[57] in which the adversary moves to a node after compromising another for a 
limited time doing similar damage. By the time the adversary gains access to t nodes (t 
shares), the whole system is considered compromised. To enhance the security of the 
system, a proactive approach has been introduced by [39] to address this problem. 
Principals should refresh their shares to the same secret periodically in a way that old 
shares cannot be combined with the new ones to build the secret. The time between two 
refreshments is called window o f  vulnerability, and for the adversary to take control of 
the system, it must compromise at least t principals no later than one window of 
vulnerability period.
A brief explanation by [26] shows how to refresh the shares in homomorphic 
secret sharing schemes as follows:
If (sj,s2,...,s/ ) is a share assignment for the key k and ( j p ^ - j ^ i s  another 
uniformly random share assignment for the "key" 0 (zero), then we have 
(sl,s"2,...,s") = (sl +s[,s2 +s'2,...,s, +£,') for the same key k .
However, if  we restrict the process of generating shares to one principal, the 
system will have a single point of failure if that principal got compromised since it could 
generate wrong shares. Hence, t correct servers should generate their shares 
(s'j^s'j 2,—,s'j:,) where j e t  and exchange the shares with all servers. Thus, the resulting
share will be s ” = y. + ^  /eiS f , , and it is an independent new share for the same key as
depicted in figure above. However, each shareholder needs to prove that its contribution
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(s[,s'2,...,s'j) is indeed a share of zero, since compromised principals may send bogus
shares or do not even send shares at all! Luckily, verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes 
could be used such as [61] in which the principal can verify and testify to the correctness 
of the corresponding shares without disclosing them by adding some other public 
information.
Fig. 2. Key refreshing sketch. Each server will generate shares for a random polynomial for the key zero 
(grouped by dotted line). Those shares are sent to corresponding servers and each one will combine the 
shares it received to construct its new share.
2.6. Overview of Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
MANET is a network architecture that can be deployed rapidly without any required 
fixed networking infrastructure. The nodes in MANET model share some unique 
characteristics such as mobility and joining/leaving the network very frequently, resulting 
in rapid changes to its topology. Moreover, nodes in MANET usually have constraints on 
their computation, storage, and power capabilities [32].
MANET is useful in situations like rescue missions, fast establishment of military 
forces, and national crises when the underlying infrastructure is no longer an option due
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the damages done by natural or other disasters. In addition, MANET has some interesting 
commercial usages in which it could be more feasible than wired networks especially in 
short-term occasions such exhibitions, conferences, or festivals [32],
In MANET, nodes could be any entities such as soldiers, rescue team members, 
planes, trains, and ships which may possess significant variations in node speeds and 
moving patterns, ranging from stationary nodes to aircraft speeds, and from 
predetermined paths such as highways to unpredictable path such as rescue helicopters 
maneuvering around a disaster area. Even with such extreme conditions, MANET is 
expected to deliver a variety of traffic types including delay/bandwidth sensitive 
applications such as voice or video [32].
Network
Connectivity
Satillite Cellular i WLAN MANET Sensor
Fig. 3. Taxonomy o f computer networking.
Moreover, MANET operates entirely through wireless medium and lacks 
centralized entities found in traditional cellular wireless networks such as base stations, 
MSC, HLR, and VLR (i.e. Mobile Switch Center, Home Location Registers, and Visitor 
Location Register respectively). Those entities are usually connected through hi-speed 
wired links and the wireless is used at the edge only (i.e. between the end-user and the 
base station).A wireless sensor network [7] is another more restricted environment with 
different assumptions which shares some of MANET constraints. Nodes are tiny devices 
deployed massively in a given place with no identification [56], In Fig. 3, we represent a
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general classification for networking systems to show where MANET fits. An example of 
current implementation of MANET includes IEEE 802.11 [2] and Bluetooth [1],
2.6.1 MANE T characteristics
To distinguish MANET from its siblings, some assumptions that characterize MANET 
are listed here [32]:
1) Power Source: Nodes are equipped with portable communication devices and 
usually powered by batteries. Thus, limited battery life could restrict the 
transmission range, communication activity and computational power of the 
node.
2) Transitivity: Connectivity between nodes is not transitive; i.e., if  node A can 
communicate directly with node B and node B can communicate directly with 
node C, then A is not necessarily able to communicate with C directly1.
3) Fixed ID: All nodes are identified by fixed IDs such as IP addresses2.
4) Locality Assumption: Usually, a large portion o f the traffic will be between 
geographically close nodes although it is not prohibited to establish a 
connection among distinct nodes.
Thus, MANET imposes some requirements in design such as a robust routing and 
mobility management algorithms to increase reliability and availability. Moreover, any 
protocol or algorithm designed for MANET should have low overhead to reduce power 
consumption.
2.6.2 Routing in MANET
MANET introduces many challenges in designing reliable routing protocols due to 
frequent topology changes, power limitations, computation capabilities, and bandwidth.
1 For example, transitivity holds in Ethernet since all nodes share the same medium.
2 Some models, such as sensor network, do not require nodes to have an ID. Therefore, this assumption 
is not a luxury.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
Those limitations impose a theme in MANET routing protocol design to favor algorithms 
which are low in overhead, adaptive, and robust [32],
MANET routing protocols could be classified as proactive or reactive [32]. 
Proactive protocols continuously exchange topological information among network nodes 
to keep routes as accurate as possible. Thus, all routing information is available 
immediately for any given node. Some example of such protocols include Optimized 
Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [37] and Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [53], On 
the other hand, reactive protocols such as Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) [16] 
and Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing protocol (AODV) [63] establish route 
on-the-fly and they do not attempt to maintain up-to-date topology of the network. 
Instead, they establish routes only when necessary. A hybrid approach also has been 
proposed, for example, a node in Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)[62] proactively maintains 
topology to close neighbors and acts reactively for nodes that reside far away.
Another classification for MANET routing protocols is based on whether they are 
location aware3 or not [32]. Examples of location aware protocols include Locating- 
Aided Routing (LAR)[42] and Distance Routing Effect Algorithm for Mobility 
(DREAM)[12].
2.6.3 A d hoc On-demand Distance Vector (A OD V)
The previous section gives a general overview of routing protocols found in MANET. 
This section will give expanded overview of the AODV routing protocol because we 
have used it in our work as the network layer in our simulation.
AODV is a reactive protocol that could be viewed as a variant of the well known 
distance vector routing protocol [67]. The AODV objectives are to broadcast discovery 
packets only when necessary. Neighbors exchange local broadcast packets called hello 
messages. The routing tables of the nodes are organized to optimize response time for 
local node movements and new route establishments. AODV assumes links are
3 They could be equipped with an external device such as GPS to obtain their geographic location.
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bidirectional. It uses a broadcast route discovery mechanism similar to DSR. The path 
discovery process in AODV is initiated when a source node wants to establish a 
connection to a destination node and no route is cached in the source table. It sends a 
route discovery packet (RREQ) to its local neighbors. The RREQ contains the source 
address, source sequence number, broadcast id, destination address, destination sequence, 
and hop count. Source address and broadcast ID fields uniquely distinguish a RREQ. 
Broadcast ID is incremented every time the node sends a new RREQ. Each node that 
receives a RREQ message either sends a route reply (RREP) if it knows a route to the 
destination, or it rebroadcasts the RREQ after decrementing the hop count (i.e. expanding 
ring search procedure). However, if  a node receives duplicate RREQs from different 
neighbors, then it should forward only the necessary ones. After broadcasting the RREQ, 
it creates an entry in order to implement the reverse path setup that contains destination 
IP address, source IP address, broadcast ID, expiration time for that entry, and source 
node's sequence number. When the RREQ arrives at a node (possibly the destination), it 
checks whether the RREQ was received over a bi-directional link. Then, if  the node has a 
route entry to the destination, it compares the destination sequence number of the RREQ 
with the one it has. If  the sequence number it has is less than the one it just received, it 
should rebroadcast the RREQ. Otherwise, it replies its cached route back to the sender to 
establish the forward path [63].
2.7. MANET Security
2.7.1 Security Difficulties in MANET
L. Buttyan and J. Hubaux [18] discussed security issues in MANET and they refer to the 
following reasons to justify why it is difficult to secure such network:
1) Channel Vulnerability: Wireless channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping and 
the injection of faked messages without any physical access.
2) Node Vulnerability: By not residing in a physically protected place, nodes can 
be captured and compromised easily by attackers.
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3) Absence o f  Infrastructure: Classical security methods that require an 
infrastructure are no longer useful due to the distributed nature o f MANET.
4) Dynamic Topology: This is a fact in MANET, and it makes routing difficult 
since incorrect routing information can be generated easily by compromised 
nodes making it difficult to distinguish this case from legitimate topology 
changes caused by mobility.
2.7.2 Availability
Availability has been addressed from different perspective and MANET is vulnerable to 
DoS attacks by abusing communication protocols which lead to a reduction of honest 
node performance or clogging the access to a needed server.
If we take the MAC layer protocol of 802.11 [2] as an example for typical 
MANET, nodes exchange RTS and CTS packets to reserve the channel before 
transmission. However, a node transmitting a packet must backoff for randomly selected 
period b which is between 0 and CW (Contention Window). If  collision happened, CW is 
doubled. Misbehaving nodes can take the advantage of the algorithm to increase their 
throughput by not respecting the protocol and choose small values to shorten the backoff 
time and increase their probability of getting the channel. This problem has been stated 
and studied by P. Kysanur and N. Vaidya [44], and they developed a solution to detect 
malicious behavior by using a traffic analysis scheme.
Another approach, which applies game-theoretic concepts, considers the 
following dilemma: Cooperation will consume resources, and it might result in a 
disadvantage, but if all nodes did not cooperate, the result is bad for all nodes. This 
dilemma was the basis for designing Cooperation O f Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc 
NeT-works (CONFIDANT) protocol [17]. Each node will learn and observe misbehaving 
nodes by monitoring the observations and reputation records generated by others. For 
example, if a node believes that another is misbehaving, then it can take action in terms 
of packet forwarding to avoid routing through that node, or it can report this behavior to 
another node by sending alarm messages about the node in question. The authors showed,
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by using simulation models, that CONFIDANT can cope well even when half of the 
nodes are misbehaving.
2.7.3 Secure Routing
Originally, MANET routing protocols like DSR [16], AODV [63], OLSR [37], WRP 
[53], ZRP [62], LAR [42], and DREAM [12] were examples of classic MANET routing 
protocols that have been proposed to be robust against topology changes, but none of 
these have applied measurements to defend against attacking route information [73]. A 
malicious node can learn the network topology by monitoring routing messages to 
conduct an attack that brings the network down. For example, it can inject bogus routing 
information, reply old information, or distorting routing information [73]. Defending 
against routing attacks is hard because it is difficult to tell if  invalid routing information 
is caused by a topology change or a compromised node. Another interesting type of 
attack is a "wormhole" attack (Y. Hu and et al. [33]) in which attackers tunnel routing 
and other traffic in one location and release them in other part of the network which 
damages the topology. The authors proposed a solution to this type of attack by the use of 
"packet leashes" in which geographical and/or temporal information are included, 
allowing the receiver to determine if the packet has traversed a realistic distance or not.
Secure-AODV [72] has been introduced as an extension to AODV routing 
protocol to protect the routing protocol's messages. Every node is assumed to have a 
certified public-key for all other nodes. The sender of any routing message will sign the 
packet and include some information generated by hashing function in a way that 
guarantees no intermediate node can decrement the hop count to solicit traffic by 
advertising a shorter path and other solutions (e.g. [59], [33], [34], [65]) which aim to 
provide solutions to various routing security problems.
2.7.4 Intrusion Detection
Encryption and Authentication are considered as intrusion prevention mechanisms. 
However, sometimes nodes get compromised, and their private-keys are exposed, which 
means the system is no longer secure. Thus, intrusion detection measures are required to 
overcome this problem. In high-security networks, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are
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necessary as a last line of defense [75], However, classic IDS are inadequate for MANET 
since they rely on real-time traffic analysis for packet traces collected from switches, 
routers, and gateways. Unfortunately, MANET lacks such infrastructure, and there are no 
physical boundaries for the system. Thus, the only way to collect data is to let nodes 
monitor traffic, which takes place in their radio range. MANET, due to its dynamic 
nature, requires an IDS solution to be fully distributed, be able to analyze local audit data, 
and make sure that it can distinguishes the thin line between anomaly and normal 
behavior. Y. Zhang and W. Lee [75] [76] addressed these issues by developing a new 
architecture called Distributed and Cooperative Intrusion Detection and evaluated its 
ability to detect intrusion. Each node has an IDS agent, and those agents collaborate to 
secure the system. Using simulation, the system has been evaluated to detect routing 
attack, packet attack, and no attack to measure false alarms. Their simulation shows very 
useful results and detected 99% of the attacks with less than 1% of false alarms.
2.8. Summary
This section has presented necessary background related to our work. A general overview 
of encryption and public/private-key cryptography has been shown followed by an 
overview of PKI and a review of its main components. We dedicated a section to discuss 
revoking schemes and gave brief details about each one. A description o f the Shamir 
scheme of secret sharing has been given with a detailed example. We followed that 
section with a description of threshold cryptography and how to make it practical using 
proactive secret sharing techniques. Another section was devoted to MANET and its 
importance, challenges, and characteristics. Taxonomy of routing protocols in MANET 
was given with a special focus on AODV protocol. We continued our discussion on 
security problems in MANET and gave examples of availability problems, secure 
routing, and intrusion detection techniques. We will delay discussing solutions for 
providing general public-key services until the next section as those are considered 
related work.




The aim of this section is to discuss the attempts to adapt public-key solutions into 
MANET. We will begin with a proposal to secure closed-networks in Section 3.1. 
Section 3.2 is about certificate-based security for self-organized networks. Sections 3.3, 
3.4, and 3.5 are dedicated to discussing URSA, COCA, and MOCA respectively, which 
are designed to address the problem of applying online CA into MANET. Finally, 
concluding remarks are in Section 3.6.
3.1. Closed-Network Solutions
Closed-Network is a kind of network in which the number and the identity o f participants 
are known a priori. The benefit of such a classification is that it allows security features 
to be implanted or agreed upon in advance since all information is known. For example, 
Asokan and Ginzboorg [11] have proposed a solution for establishing a secure ad hoc 
network without access to a public-key infrastructure. They gave a scenario of a small 
group of people (each one with a laptop) meeting in a classroom and wanting to 
communicate securely. To achieve that goal, they need to agree on a password and use it 
for that session (e.g. write it down on the blackboard).
Hu et al. [34] proposed more automated ways to do secure routing with public- 
keys by preloading every node with the public-keys of all other participants as part of the 
initialization phase for their proposal. The problem of such an approach is flexibility 
since new nodes cannot be added to the network. They have suggested another 
modification by allowing an offline CA to certify nodes; therefore, nodes can authenticate 
each other by certificates signed by that CA.
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3.2. Self-Organized Solutions
The term Self-Organized security is used to refer to a setting where there is no central 
authority to control the establishment and/or releasing of security associations and it is up 
to each node to decide which other node(s) to trust or communicate with [20] by making 
each one act as a self-CA.
The first solution for the self-organized public-key management system for 
MANET which is similar to PGP [41] was suggested by Hubaux et al.[36], Users issue 
certificates to each other based on some kind of contact such as personal, social, 
friendship, relational or association (represented in each node by a directed edge in the 
node trust graph). Each user maintains a local certificate repository, and when two users 
want to verify each other, they exchange their local repositories (i.e. their digraphs) and 
try to find appropriate certificate chains connecting both ends in the resulting merged 
graph. Hubaux et al. have suggested an efficient method, The Shortcut Hunter algorithm, 
to find the shortest path between any two principals (i.e. nodes). The framework assumed 
that nodes are honest and will not issue false certificates, but the authors have suggested 
some metrics when that assumption is relaxed.
3.3. Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA)
The goal of Kong's et al. [43] is to provide pervasive CA services by making all n nodes 
in the network share CA functionality. All participants sharing the private-key is 
obviously unfeasible and not realistic since t = n (i.e. only one node needs to be 
compromised to deny the service). To overcome this problem, the same private-key is 
distributed among coalitions (as referenced in URSA), and each one has at least t 
member nodes, which are one hop apart from each other. Thus, a client needs to contact 
t nodes only, rather than n , by sending a local broadcast request and collecting t replies 
to obtain the service.
This scheme has an adapted RSA-based design for cryptographic operations. The 
CA service has a single private-key for signing certificates and it is not known, as a 
whole, to any member node of the MANET. However, any t nodes at a given coalition
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can collectively act as a CA by using their shares to sign certificates and every node has 
its own public/private-key to do end-to-end security functions (e.g. encrypting or signing 
messages as an individual).
Nodes obtain their shares either when bootstrapping the system or using self­
initialization algorithm. At the startup of the system, a centralized management, also 
known as "trusted dealer," will distribute t shares to t nodes just before forming the 
MANET. After initializing those t nodes, the centralized management is no longer 
needed, and any additional uninitialized node can retrieve its secret share by sending a 
one-hop local broadcast to a coalition of t nodes. They then send their partially signed 
certificates back to the requester. Once the requester collects t partial certificates, it 
reconstructs the complete certificate. However, once a certificate is issued, it is trusted by 
the entire; network, therefore, a well defined issuing policy is needed to control the 
issuing of certificates.
Certificate renewal must be done before its expiration time by presenting a valid 
unexpired certificate to a coalition. Then, the coalition will check its CRL, verify the 
certificate, and issue a new certificate with a new, later, expiration time.
A certificate is implicitly revoked when it is expired and explicit revocation is 
handled by an issuance of a counter certificate that flooded into the network. Besides 
flooding, neighbors can safely exchange their local CRL cache to build a more complete 
CRL.
From a security point of view, the adversary group will not have the secret if less 
than t nodes are compromised. Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) protocol is used to 
prevent the adversary from learning the service private-key in the long term with the 
assumption that it cannot compromise more than t - 1 between any two consecutive 
secret-sharing updates. Additionally, it is easy for a client to verify whether the 
reconstructed certificate is correct or not.
URSA assumes that t one-hop neighbors or more usually exist. Nevertheless, in a 
mobile environment, this may not be the case, and Kong et al. suggest that if the client
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does not receive sufficient response, within some time limit, then it should move to 
another location and try another coalition.
The authors provided Unix and NS-2 [47] implementations for URSA to measure 
cryptographic and mobility costs respectively. They simulated network topologies, which 
have 30 to 100 nodes and mobility between 1 to 20 m/sec for 5 minutes using a random 
waypoint. The value of t was chosen to be 3 when simulating a 30 node scenario and 5 
otherwise. The success ratio is almost 100% for all variations.
3.4. Cornell Online Certificate Authority (COCA)
COCA [74] is a secure online certification authority that was originally designed and 
deployed in LANs and the Internet. The designers made weak assumptions4 regarding the 
environment in which COCA can operate. No assumption has been made about execution 
speed and message delivery delays. COCA applies some traditional means to defend 
against denials-of-service attacks such as processing authenticated requests only, caching 
results of expensive cryptographic operations, and multiplexing resources to balance the 
demand of various classes of requests.
COCA is the first system that integrates a Byzantine quorum system [46] with 
threshold cryptography and addresses some problems that arise when combining the two. 
Additionally, the authors have demonstrated experimentally the difficulty of launching 
successful attack against their system.
A certificate request sent by a client is received by a selected COCA server, called 
the delegate, which forwards the request to all COCA servers. Then, it waits for signed 
partial certificates from a quorum of COCA servers. Once those partials have been 
received by the delegate, it invokes COCA's threshold signature protocol to sign that
4 i.e. the protocol, theoretically, will converge to a stable state regardless o f how long it takes to go to 
that state. One such weak assumption is that a correct message will eventually be delivered when sent 
repeatedly.
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certificate. To update certificate information, the delegate will need further steps, which 
are discussed in more detail at [74].
It is possible that the delegate itself can be compromised and deviated from the 
protocol. Thus, the client needs to contact a  other delegates to ensure that it will get at 
least one correct response. However, in normal circumstances, the client may contact just 
one delegate, a  = 1, to do certificate operations. Zhou and Hass [73] sketched how to 
deploy COCA in MANET, but they did not provide any performance results. The original 
COCA protocol was written in "C" and they [74] provided some measurements for a 
sample deployment of four machines with t set to one.
3.5. Mobile Certificate Authority (MOCA)
MOCA [70] was created taking a MANET environment into consideration as an 
extension to an earlier prototype [71]. A MOCA is a mobile node within the MANET 
selected to provide distributed CA functionality. Typically, more powerful and more 
secure nodes are chosen to provide CA service to other nodes. MOCA nodes apply 
threshold cryptography to share the responsibility and increase availability o f the 
MANET. Client nodes use MP (MOCA certification Protocol) to contact sufficient 
MOCAs and use their services.
When a client wants to contact another client, it sends "Certificate Request" 
(CREQ) packets to t or more MOCA servers and waits for some time. Any MOCA 
receiving a CREQ will reply by sending a "Certification Reply" (CREP) packet 
containing its partial signature. Once the client receives t valid CREPs, it can reconstruct 
the whole certificate. CREQ and CREP messages are similar to Route Request (RREQ) 
and Route Reply (RREP) messages in on demand ad hoc routing protocols such as 
AODV [63] andDSR[16],
To increase system availability, MOCA clients send /? unicast CREQ, where 
P = t + a ,  and a  is determined in each client by inspecting the status o f the network. 
Moreover, to avoid flooding the network, clients inspect the route table to see if  any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
cached routes to MOCAs are available, thus, making flooding the last resort. Yi and 
Kravets [70] have tested several alternatives when the number of cached routes to MOCA 
servers is more than /?.
Yi and Kravets' performance criteria were to measure the ratio o f CREQ and 
CREP messages in their scheme over the sum of CREQ and CREP in pure flooding. 
MOCA scheme has achieved a 5-30% improvement over pure flooding. We will discuss 
their results in the next section.
It is worth mentioning that one minor technical difference between MOCA and 
COCA frameworks is that the construction of the certificate is done at the client side 
which adds CPU overhead to MOCA clients, while the reconstruction is done at the 
delegate server in the case of COCA framework.
Finally, we present an illustration to show the difference between some of the 
related work presented in this section.


















Fig. 4. A hypothetical request sent by a client (denoted by "C") to obtain a certificate from available CA 
servers (denoted by circle labeled "CA") using various protocols, (a) COCA (b) MOCA (c) URSA.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show, respectively, how a request and its reply would be handled 
for a client to obtain a certificate for various protocols. Each packet sent is represented by 
a black arrow and the light gray arrows in Fig. 4(a) represent a communication made by 
the CA on behalf of the requesting client. We assume that the threshold is three (i.e. the 
client needs at least three correct replies).




















Fig. 5. The replies sent by servers (denoted by "CA") back to the requester (denoted by circle labeled "C") 
using various protocols, (a) COCA (b) MOCA (c) URSA.
3.6. Conclusion
This section was dedicated to discussing related work adapting public-key and PKI 
services into MANET. We have started the section by showing security solutions for a 
small MANET followed by an overview of a self-organizing key-management system. 
We have expanded the discussion to include USRA, COCA, and MOCA to show more 
relevant work to what we are proposing.




This section is dedicated to describing our framework from the design perspective. 
Section 4.1 describes our motivation to develop "CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks" (CACMAN). The system assumptions are listed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
describes the CACMAN-basic protocol in depth. Other possible techniques for 
implementing the CACMAN communication protocol are discussed in Section 4.4. 
Variations and enhancements to the basic framework are given in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 
discusses CRL techniques and the consequences when deployed in the framework. 
Miscellaneous details such as key refreshing between CACMAN CAs and "partial 
certificates compaction and redundancy removal" are addressed in Section 4.7. Section 
4.8 illustrates deployment scenarios in hybrid-MANET. Section 4.9 is our conclusion.
4.1. Motivation
Based on the discussion of related work found in Section 3, we strongly believe that there 
is room for enhancing the performance and service availability of the CA service. The 
main objective of this work is to reduce the amount of overhead (e.g. total number of 
packets per request) associated with providing pervasive threshold based CA services 
without significantly affecting its availability or compromising its security.
Closed-network (Section 3.1) and self-organized (Section 3.2) security solutions 
are feasible for small size networks, but they cannot scale when the number of nodes is 
large and/or the membership is dynamic. Moreover, self-organized solutions, though 
elegant, are based on the transitivity of trust security assumption (i.e. PGP-like) in which 
there is no agreed third entity (or anchor point) that every principal will automatically 
trust. Thus, self-organized solutions are suitable for securing personal communication at 
the application level as noted by Capkun et al. [20], Moreover, when a node joins the
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network, it cannot start functioning unless it builds its own trust network, which takes a 
considerable amount of time.
The URSA scheme (Section 3.3) is interesting but vulnerable because small 
values for t were chosen to increase the availability of the system; however, this also 
jeopardizes its security. Furthermore, finding one-hop t neighbors to obtain the service is 
difficult especially when t is high. We believe that the tradeoff between availability and 
robustness can be separated. Another shortcoming is that any issued certificate by any 
coalition is trusted by definition, which is problematic since there is no known entity to 
make the decision of issuing or revoking a certificate. Moreover, there is considerable 
overhead for each node when joining/leaving a coalition every time it changes its 
location. Besides, it is not known what a coalition member should do if the number o f the 
members are less than t .
On the other hand, MOCA framework (Section 3.5) is useful but very expensive. 
More specifically, we have major two concerns about MOCA. First, the number of 
MOCA nodes is relatively high, about 10-20% of the total number o f participants. 
Making such large number of CA servers to increase availability does not come without 
consequences, such as the overhead associated with replica synchronization and key 
refreshing between CAs, besides increasing physical exposure of the system. Notice that 
the flooding protocol [71] is independent of the number of CAs and, hence, is not 
sensitive to the number deployed in the field. Second, and more important, the ratio of 
MOCA Certificate Requests (CREQs) and Certificate Replies (CREPs) as compared to 
flooding is high- at best 70%- when /? = 5 (remember t < /3 ) and « = 30 [70], In our 
opinion, making a vital service that expensive is undesirable. COCA (Section 3.4) shares 
the same shortcoming as MOCA.
The argument of Kong's et al. [43] against dedicated CA service (i.e. COCA and 
MOCA) makes sense. They argued that high mobility will make contacting dedicated CA 
servers in a timely fashion a non-trivial task. Besides, the CA could be multiple hops 
away from the client, which increases latency.
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Our work, based on caching, could be viewed as an enhancement to overcome the 
performance concerns regarding MOCA framework. The novelty o f such enhancement is 
to maintain availability and efficiency of the system even when t is high -more secure 
and less exposed to adversaries- without significant tradeoff to the network overhead by, 
collaboratively, caching full and partially signed certificates5 into clients' memory. Our 
work could be viewed as a hybrid between MOCA and URSA with more novel and 
unique enhancements. Our protocol still needs CA servers, but also requires clients' 
participation to enhance the service.
Caching has been used in various aspects o f computer systems, either as hardware 
or a software component, to avoid many inherent delay penalties associated with the high 
speed gap of various system components or to increase their availability in the case of a 
failure that happened to other components. For instance, in MANET, caching of route 
information has been used to reduce the overhead associated with flooding the network 
by route discovery messages (e.g. DSR [16] and AODV [63]). Another usage of caching 
in MANET is to increase the availability of web services such as in [31], [13]. In our 
case, we are trying to decrease the service overhead and power consumption associated 
with such overhead.
We believe that certificate caching is an important concept due to following
factors:
1) Small Foot Print: A certificate consumes around lk, and this is a negligible 
size compared to other objects (e.g. multimedia objects).
2) Long Validity: Usually certificates tend to have a relatively long life, about a 
year, and this is a desirable property since it increases the ability of clients to 
cache them for long time without the necessity to purge them due to a new 
update.
5 In this section, the terms 'share' and 'partial certificate' will be used interchangeably.
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3) Centralized Update Point: A certificate is usually updated by the CA only, 
and this eliminates many problems associated with replicated data objects 
when conflict update happens because the object is changed by different 
entities at different locations.
Caching certificates is safe, and if an adversary compromises less than t 
CACMAN CA servers and clients have cached the faked share generated by these 
compromised CAs, then the faked shares will not reconstruct correctly. This could 
increase the overhead for a client since it needs to identify the compromised shares. 
However, schemes discussed by Desmedt [26] and additional cautions could be applied 
like using misbehaver detection schemes (Section 2.7.2) to alleviate the problem.
4.2. Framework Assumptions
This section lists the most important assumptions and conditions that make CACMAN 
useful and practical. We would like to emphasize that many of these assumptions are 
found in related work.
1) CA Initialization: CA servers must be initialized by a trusted entity or some 
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) techniques are used to ensure correct partial- 
keys have been deployed and every CA indeed receives a valid share o f the 
secret.
2) Window o f  Vulnerability: Malicious node(s) cannot compromise more than t 
CA servers at any given window of vulnerability.
3) CA Role: CA in CACMAN is the same as in MOCA. We did not involve CA 
servers in any optimization or enhancement so that we can measure 
CACMAN clients' performance.
4) CA Cost: CA servers are expensive entities in the system and cannot be 
deployed massively (e.g., many CA operations are of the order 0 (n 2) ).
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5) Node Correctness: Nodes in CACMAN, at any given time, are either 
malicious or correct. If a CACMAN node is correct, it will follow the 
protocol. Otherwise, it will deviate from the protocol arbitrarily.
6) Security Essentiality: Security is an essential part of the network and 
certification services are used heavily in most services such as authentication, 
sending messages, exchanging routing information, and so on6.
7) Bandwidth Limitation: The bandwidth and the delay in the underlying 
MANET in which CACMAN is deployed is limited, and we are more 
interested in trading storage to save some bandwidth.
8) Fair Links: is a communication channel exists by which if we send an enough 
messages between any two points, some will arrive correctly [74], If  no 
message can arrive intact, it is impossible to build a useful communication 
protocol. This assumption is reasonable and realistic for MANET.
9) Power Consumption: Sending a packet in MANET is an expensive operation 
in terms of power consumption (e.g. sending a 1 kb data packet will consume 
as much energy as processing 300 million instructions in some general 
purpose [60] or PDA [3] microprocessor.
10) Open Network: CACMAN nodes do not necessarily know or trust each other 
since assuming a self-organized or closed network will reduce the necessity of 
adapting PKI solution.
11) Online CAs: This assumption is to differentiate it from offline CA, as assumed 
in some other public-key solutions (Sections 3.1 and 3.2).
6 Thus, a client may have more than one certificate, i.e. one for login and another for email. Therefore, 
the reader should not assume one certificate per client, although we have assumed that in the simulation for 
simplicity.
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12) Single CA Service: This assumption is to simplify the discussion without 
losing generality. The performance evaluation for CACMAN has been done 
with this consideration.
13) Servers Communication: CACMAN does not make any assumptions on how 
servers are communicating with each other (e.g. multicast) for some 
operations that require consensus such as key refreshing or signing CRLs.
14) MANET Assumptions: To avoid redundancy, MANET model assumptions 
mentioned in Section 2.6.1 still hold in CACMAN.
4.3. Protocol Description
Two important operations occur in every CACMAN node, CREQ and CREP7 which are 
described here. When a client wants to obtain other client(s)' certificates to establish a 
secure communication or to encrypt some messages, the following algorithm will be 
executed:
1) It checks its own cache to find out the availability o f a complete certificate, or 
it will identify the missing parts if partially signed certificates are found.
2) If there is no sufficient number of partially signed certificates, then it makes a 
local broadcast. However, if  it happens that the source has a short route to the 
subject in question, it should favor sending the CREQ to that subject instead 
of making a local broadcast.
3) Every client that receives a CREQ message inspects its cache for a possible 
hit. It sends a CREP back to the sender if a full or any partial certificate is 
found for the subject.
7 We are using the same abbreviations, CREQ and CREP, used in [70], to refer to 'Certificate Request' 
and 'Certificate Reply' respectively.
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4) The request initiator waits for a specified time; if it receives sufficient 
responses then it reconstructs the certificate. Notice that the client could 
receive a complete certificate, which eliminates the reconstruction step but not 
the verification. If the request initiator times out because insufficient partials 
have been received or the reconstruction has failed, then the client may try to 
contact CA servers by flooding the network or by sending unicast messages if 
it has sufficient routes to them. Otherwise, it reports a failure to the client or 
retries later.
The last step of the protocol is, somehow, open because, in our opinion, such 
decisions should not be taken without knowing the application domain.
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Fig. 6. State Diagram for CREQ operation in CACMAN. (Transition format is "cause / output")
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Fig. 7. State diagram for CREP (with X-Reps enhancement).
4.4. Alternative Communication Paradigms
In Section 4.3, we mentioned that a CREQ is sent by local broadcast. However, it does 
not mean that this is the only way of sending CREQs. Other possible alternatives to 
contact CA servers or CACMAN, in no specific order, are8:
1) Unicast: a client will contact every server (CA or CACMAN) by sending 
unicast CREQ messages.
2) Flooding: a CREQ will be flooded into the network and every server that 
receives the request will send a reply.
3) Scoped Flooding: a CREQ will flood the network but with controlled "Time 
to Live" (TTL) to reduce the amount of overhead and still guarantee the 
CREQ is received by a sufficient number of servers.
8 Of course, these methods are generic, but we show them here in CACMAN context.
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4) Multicasting: a multicast tree is built between a client and all servers. A 
CREQ will be sent to the tree and CREPs are sent back to the client. There is 
overhead associated with maintaining and updating the multicast tree.
5) Scoped Multicasting: The main idea is similar to multicasting. However, once 
a CREQ is sent, a TTL value associated with it is received by some CA 
servers and does not necessarily reach every node in the tree, especially leaf 
nodes.
The first and second method have been used in MOCA (Section 3.5) and the 
remaining three are examined by Carter et al. [22] but in the context of manycast 
problem. The performance of the first and second techniques are examined in Section 5 
and compared to CACMAN. Carter et al. have shown that the forth and the fifth methods 
were as expensive as flooding9!
4.5. Variations and Enhancements
The previous section illustrated CACMAN in it basic form. Here, we will show some 
enhancements that could be incorporated into the protocol to increase its performance. 
Each of those enhancements, except the one in Section 4.5.4, has been simulated, and the 
results are reported in Section 5.
4.5.1 X-Replies
Basically, instead of sending one CREP when a CACMAN server receives a CREQ, it 
will send at most X different replies to the requester based on their availability if there is 
no full certificate found. The reason behind this enhancement is to increase the likelihood 
of getting all necessary shares to reconstruct the certificate and to make the chance o f 
delivering more desired partials if the earlier one, though not identical, did not arrive due 
to congestion or disconnection.
9 In that paper, the authors examined ADMR [40] as multicasting protocol.
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4.5.2 Lazy-Replies and Lazy-Replies with Cancellation
"Lazy-Replies" and "Lazy-Replies with Cancellation" share the goal o f reducing the 
amount o f dropped packets caused by "reverse storm effect" [21] when packets arrive at 
the originator from multiple links at the same time. This is done by allowing CACMAN 
server to defer their CREPs, if they had any, once they receive a CREQ for a randomly 
chosen period between 0 and 5 ,  similar to backoff algorithms used in various 
networking protocols. The exclusive goal for "Lazy-Replies with Cancellation" 
enhancement is to reduce packet overhead by allowing CACMAN client which had 
sufficient number of replies, i.e. t , to broadcast a cancellation packet, after their CREQ, 
notifying CACMAN server(s) that have scheduled their CREP(s) but not yet sent them to 
disregard their outgoing CREP(s).
4.5.3 Cache-Focus
The goal of this enhancement is to understand the effect of forcing some discriminative 
rulings on which partials are allowed to be cached in CACMANs' memory. Intuitively, 
we thought "Cache-Focus" would reduce the amount of duplicate packets sent by clients 
due to possible similarities as in the basic protocol. In Cache-Focus, each client, once it 
boots up, will choose one or more CA servers and cache any partials belonging to the 
chosen CAs. These partials could be obtained when the client receives CREPs by request 
or overhears them due to requests issued by other clients. Of course, a client will apply 
some cache replacement policy once it gets a candidate partial and its memory is full.
Finally, one drawback of Cache-Focus is that filling the cache will take longer 
with the CACMAN nodes because not every overheard or received partial is allowed to 
be cached; however, a slight enhancement could relax the problem by allowing partials 
which are not members of the focus group to be cached if  the memory at the client 
permits, but those partials will have the highest chance o f being victims if another 
candidate share arrives.
4.5.4 Explicit CREQ
The purpose of this enhancement is to eliminate duplicate partial replies if  the requester 
already has those partials. For example, if the requester already has 13 partial certificates
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out o f 15 for a given subject, then the client is interested in acquiring any two partials that 
it does not have. There is no value of getting the same partials again, especially when 
they affect the bandwidth and energy, and consume valuable CPU time. One way of 
implementing this enhancement is to add bitmap fields in the CREQ header, in which 
each bit represents a server ID; the requester will set the bits that correspond to the 
partials it has for the certificate in question. Now, when a CACMAN node receives a 
CREQ, it can decide whether its cache will benefit the requester or not.
4.6. CRL in CACMAN
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has requested that the 
MITRE Corporation study the cost o f implementing and deploying PKI for the federal 
government [51]. The conclusion shows that Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is 
considered as the most expensive component of PKI framework. In MANET, the 
situation is more challenging due to its inherent properties. In this section, we will 
analyze the consequences of integrating various CRL schemes into CACMAN without 
favoring any specific scheme since this needs more detailed assumptions.
Let us first start with the simplest solution, that is, a system with short-lived 
certificates only. Such systems will require CA servers to be always online and no CRL 
needs to be issued. The consequence of this model is that it will destroy the temporal 
locality and, hence, will make caching useless especially in applications that require real­
time certification10. However, this is an extreme side o f the situation, and many 
applications and transactions have less strenuous requirements for certificate freshness. 
For example, CACMAN could be deployed in an environment that accepts a validity 
period of, say, a couple of days or weeks without CRL.
10 When the client and server clocks are not synchronized, an accuracy of 15 seconds is de facto real­
time. Evermore, most financial applications trust 4-hour old signatures [49].
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Now, let us consider a more challenging environment that requires both types of 
certificates11 (i.e. short and long-lived). In this environment, CRL is needed and 
CACMAN should distinguish between both types of certificates and allow CACMAN 
clients to cache long-lived certificates besides handling CRL distribution efficiently.
If  we apply OCSP [41], RCA [52], or NOVOMODO [49], we introduce another 
server to answer queries about revocation status which means a single point of failure has 
been added to the system. Replicating OCSP will expose the system more and make it 
more complicated. Another alternative design is to make status checking done by 
CACMAN CAs themselves. In this case, we utilize the security investment (i.e. threshold 
based protocol); however, we increase the burden on CA servers and imagine how every 
queried CA will try to collect at least t agreements to sign replies and this is exactly what 
we are trying to avoid.
Now, let us consider the fundamental CRL method in which every list contains a 
field telling when the next issue will be. Since this information is signed by CAs and 
publicly available, there is no harm in duplicating them to some other nodes by flooding 
and hoping the list will be delivered to all nodes or by selecting some strategic nodes 
which could volunteer to carry this burden. The problem arises when a given node missed 
an update (i.e. the "next update" time elapsed), in this case, if  the client does not receive 
the CRL in the expected time frame, then it should consider its cache as suspicious and 
purge it. A possible enhancement is to mark the cached partials as dirty without using 
them, hoping the list would be obtained when the network is connected again by 
retrieving the missing update from any neighbor or querying any CACMAN server. Delta 
CRL will have similar situation but with the more challenging problem of probably 
seeking more than one missing CRL update12, and it has the advantage of having compact 
size.
11 For example, short-lived certificates are issued for single onetime login tickets and long-lived ones 
are issued for authorizing financial transactions that are less than a given amount.
12 Remember Delta CRL is issued incrementally and the verifier should obtain all issued lists.
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Yet another method is to issue counter certificate as implemented in URSA 
(Section 3.3). The advantage of this method is that it does not put any timing 
requirements in revoking certificates (i.e. revoke on demand). One problem is to make 
sure that a counter certificate is propagated to all legitimate nodes. A simple solution, 
though not bullet proof, is to flood the network whenever a counter certificate is issued. 
To make the solution even better, every counter certificate issued by the CA should 
contain an auto increment number. The purpose of that number is to allow any 
CACMAN client to determine whether it has missed any counter certificate issuance or 
not. However, this is possible if we assume that any given node is surrounded by one or 
more legitimate nodes. The client will send, say, a local broadcast message showing the 
last counter certificate which it has received, and legitimate nodes will tell if the last 
counter certificate heard by the requester is indeed the latest one.
CACMAN framework has no problem adapting the CRL methods mentioned 
above, and there are no security threats of caching CRL since it is public information 
signed by CA servers. The answer to the question "Which CRL method is suitable for 
MANET?" seems to be application dependant. We think integrating Delta CRL into CA 
servers is reasonable for most applications while others that need more freshness may 
request the CA directly.
4.7. Other Issues Associated with the Framework
4.7.1 Key Refreshing between CAs
Key refreshing is an important operation done by CA servers to protect against malicious 
attackers from learning the secret over a long period. CACMAN nodes do not interfere 
with that operation. However, there is a problem after refreshing CAs partial-keys: any 
issued partial certificates are no longer compatible with the shares residing in CACMAN 
client caches. We emphasize that this incompatibility does not mean those partials cached 
in CACMAN nodes are obsolete. They are still valid but not compatible with any feature
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issued partials13. However, a node should somehow have the means to distinguish 
between old and new shares. One possible way is to make CREPs contain a number that 
tells in which epoch this partial has been signed. To reduce the overhead of 
housekeeping, CACMAN node should delete shares belongs to old epoch.
4.7.2 Partial Certificates Compaction and Redundancy Removal
The purpose of this operation, as the name suggests, is to remove redundant shares 
carried by clients. This process reduces the storage needed to carry certificates since a 
partially signed certificate is as large as a complete one. Additionally, it saves some 
bandwidth because a single complete certificate may travel instead of several partial 
ones, particularly when the threshold is relatively high.
The procedure could be executed periodically14, and each CACMAN node locally 
broadcasts a list that contains the missing parts needed to complete its collection; then, 
surrounding CACMANs will send back missing parts, if  available, to the client for 
reconstruction.
It is possible that some partials will not be combined because they have been 
originated from a compromised CA or modified by a malicious CACMAN. But as we 
have mentioned in Section 2.5, detection schemes without exhaustive search will be used 
to figure out and delete wrong partials.
4.7.3 Distribution o f  Partially Cached Certificates
One important issue is how to distribute full or partial certificates coherently in the 
system to reduce the possibility of having the same full or partial certificates residing in 
adjacent neighbors. We suggest some techniques on how every node decides whether it 
caches an overheard certificate(s) or hopes that other node(s) do it. Such a decision will
13 Remember that key refreshing does not change the private-key o f the service. Otherwise, every node 
should be informed by such change and this will reduce the usefulness of the service.
14 It is not necessary that all CACMAN nodes execute the procedure at the same time. Every CACMAN 
node can decide individually when the next execution to refresh its repository will occur.
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affect two things. First, it will affect the possibility for a CACMAN client to find that 
certificate in the future. Second, it will affect the chance for that client to offer that 
certificate to other CACMAN clients.
Here, we show some possible techniques on how coherent distribution is possible:
1) All on the Path Cache: This is the simplest method, when a CREP message 
travels through its path, every client in that path will cache the partially signed 
certificate contained in that reply.
2) All Can Hear Cache: In this method, every node that receives a CREP, 
including nodes that reside in the radio range of the node that forwarded the 
CREP, will cache the partial certificate. This method will make nodes have 
similar caches especially in low mobility scenarios. However, in high 
mobility, and more specifically when each node goes to unrelated directions, 
this and "All on the Path Cache" can be useful to make an even distribution of 
the certificates or partials.
3) Path Flip-flop Cache: In this case, a node residing in the CREP path inspects 
the header; if the node order is odd, then it will cache that CREP, including 
the recipient. This heuristic tries to discriminate certificate distribution 
because it makes no sense for two adjacent nodes to have almost the same 
contents. The advantage of this technique is more noticeable in low-mobility 
scenarios. However, it is not possible for some routing protocols (e.g. AODV) 
to know if a given node is even or not in a given message path. In that case, a 
user-defined Boolean field in the CREP header could be used to implement 
this heuristic by flipping its value in every node the CREP visits and cache 
only iff the field is set.
4) Probabilistic Cache: every node receiving a CREP will cache it based on a 
predefined probability. This probably should be chosen based on network 
density (e.g. low probability in dense networks and high probability in low 
density networks).
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Fig. 8 illustrates these alternatives. The "S" node denotes a CACMAN that sent a 
CREP or a client node that received a CREQ and it has the certificate in question in its 
local cache. The "R" node denotes the request issuer. Nodes labeled "C" denote clients 
that will cache that particular CREP and empty nodes are those that will take no action. 
The arrows denote the CREP path and the gray lines denote the connectivity (e.g. in the 




Fig. 8. Cache Heuristics (a) All on the Path Cache (b) All Can Hear Cache (c) Path Flip-flop Cache (d) 
Probabilistic Cache.
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4.7.4 Cache Replacement Policy
When a CACMAN node wants to cache a certificate and it happens that its cache is full, 
several classic policies could be used to choose the victim, such as LRU or FIFO. 
Additionally, other possible criteria are based on the completeness of the victim 
certificate and could be combined to previously mentioned techniques. There are 
additional possibilities on how to choose the victim:
1) The victim could be the new partial itself since the caching CACMAN client 
has a complete certificate making the former redundant.
2) The victim partial would be the one corresponding to a certificate that has the 
minimum number of shares at that client.
3) If the received reply is a complete certificate, the decision is easier; the victim 
would be those partials that correspond to the complete certificate. If  none 
exist, option 2) could be applied.
4.8. Deployment Scenarios in Hybrid MANET
MANET usually has been seen as an isolated network that does not have a connection to 
the outside world. This is acceptable in some context and scenarios, but a more generic 
model is possible, "hybrid MANET." This is a topology that integrates a MANET with a 
gateway connected to the Internet.
We think of two possible scenarios for deploying CACMAN CA servers in such 
environments as those illustrated in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Both configurations share the 
following components: a MANET infrastructure connected to an access point which is 
connected to a fixed infrastructure via a satellite link. The fixed infrastructure in turn is 
connected, through routers, to a higher level CA server residing on the Internet which 
may cover other networks. The principal difference between the two configurations is 
where to deploy CACMAN CA servers. Deploying CACMAN CAs outside the MANET, 
as in Fig. 9 , will eliminate CA exposure to wireless threats (i.e. more security). 
Moreover, if we allow some CA to acts as delegates -  similar to COCA- a CACMAN
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client will be required to contact one CA server to get a complete certificate which 
eliminates the overhead of caching partials while still caching full certificate. The 
disadvantage of this design is that the gateway will be a bottleneck on the system, and the 
inherent propagation delay of satellite connection will reduce response time. 
Additionally, it will be a single point of failure, and if compromised, CA service in the 
MANET will be denied.





In te rn e t
H ig h e r  level (  CA
Fig. 9. CACMAN CA servers outside MANET domain.
On the other hand, deploying CA services within MANET will eliminate the 
frequent access to the access point except when communicating with the higher level CA, 
which is rarely required, in addition to a fast response time. Deploying CA inside the 
MANET will require more care regarding CA security since they will be more exposed 
and probably require a higher threshold for the system, as compared to the former design, 
to ensure security.
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4.9. Conclusion and Summary
We began this section by showing our motivation to develop CACMAN. We followed by 
listing the framework assumptions. A detailed description of the basic protocol was given 
followed by surveying possible communication techniques. Details about various 
enhancements to our framework were given followed by a discussion on the impact of 
some CRL schemes on CACMAN. Then we examined other miscellaneous issues such as 
removing redundancy partials and alterative ways to spread partially cached certificates. 
Finally, deployment scenarios for hybrid-MANET were discussed. In the next section, we 
will evaluate CACMAN from performance perspective and show how it reacts to various 
enhancements.




In this section, we put CACMAN to the test. We have implemented and simulated the 
basic protocol and its variations and enhancements mentioned in Sections 4.3 and 4.5. 
The purpose of doing this simulation is twofold. First, it provides us a basis for putting 
CACMAN and related work side by side to get a more objective comparison. Second, it 
allows us to see how the protocol parameters might behave in practice, hence, allowing 
us to check their significance to the framework.
At the preliminary stage of this work, we have evaluated CACMAN-Basic using a 
Monte Carlo simulation that we developed [1]. At that time, this was sufficient to provide 
us with the preliminary results to continue in this direction, but it was not sufficient to 
draw a faithful conclusion that could be used to compare it with related work. This is 
because it is not as realistic as the NS-2 [47], and besides, it does not consider mobility 
and other parameters. Here, we will show CACMAN simulation results obtained from 
NS-2 which eliminates the necessity of presenting the outcomes obtained from the Monte 
Carlo simulation. Additionally, we will restrict our comparison to MOCA protocol for the 
same reasons as shown in 4.1.
This section is organized as follows: Section 5.1 highlights some details about the 
simulation environment. Section 5.2 lists the simulation assumptions. The results and 
discussion are shown in Sections 5.3 and Section 5.4. Section 5.5 is our concluding 
remarks.
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5.1. Simulation Description
In our simulations, we used the most recent build of NS-215 to simulate the following 
scenario similar to the one used in MOCA [70], The goal o f this choice, as mentioned 
before, is to achieve a fair comparison between the two protocols. Furthermore, we 
replicated the Flooding scenario described in [70] and [71] to make sure that we have 
almost identical settings, and it turned out that the differences are negligible.
The scenario used for our simulation follows: 150 mobile nodes were scattered in 
a 1000 m2 field, 30 of which are CA servers to the remaining 120 client's nodes. All 
nodes are moving using the CMU random waypoint model [15]. One hundred nodes will 
make 10 CREQs during the 600 second simulation time. We have generated nodes 
mobility scenarios for maximum speeds of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20 m/sec with pause times of 0 
and 10 seconds. Each configuration is replicated at least three times16 to ensure the 
accuracy of the results. In the original paper [70], a network of 300 nodes including 50 
servers, has been simulated too, but the paper did not show the results due to the 
similarity to 150 node case. In addition, we used caches capable of holding 75, 150, 225, 
and 300 shares, and we tested thresholds of 5, 15, 20, and 25. We have used a single 
cache replacement policy in which it is applied when a CREP arrives and there is no 
room in the client's local cache. The policy is to delete a share that corresponds to the 
certificate which has the minimum shares at that client.
For convenience, the simulation settings for the most frequently referenced 
parameters are summarized in Table II.
15 A short overview o f NS-2 can be found in Appendix A .
16 In our case, replicating the experiment more than three times did not show any significant differences 
in the results.
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Ta b l e  II
Sim u l a t io n  p a r a m e t e r s  u s e d  in  im p l e m e n t in g  CACMAN
Parameter Value I
Grid size 1000 m2
Maximum speed 1,10, and 20 meters/second
Pause time 0 and 10 seconds
Simulation time 600 seconds
Total number of nodes 150
Number o f MOCA servers 30
Threshold ( t ) 5,15,25
Cache sizes 75, 150, and 225
Routing protocol AODV
Mobility model Random waypoint
Total number of requests 1000
Cache replacement policy for 
CACMAN













If  a full certificate exists, then send it. 1 
Otherwise, send one share selected 
randomly.
CACMAN-X replies
If  a full certificate exists, then send it. 
Otherwise, send X shares selected randomly 
if  available.
GO




One cache hit, shares(s) are scheduled to be 
sent on delay periods between (0 and X) 
where X=T0ms, 40ms, 160ms, or 640ms.
ei
CACMAN-Lazy replies with 
cancellation option
Similar to CACMAN-Lazy replies but the 
requester will send cancel message if it has 









The cache is filled by shares that belong to 
its focus group G where |G| = [1..30],
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5.2. Simulation Assumptions
Here we list our simulation assumptions that govern our results and all interpretations 
should consider such assumptions.
1) There are many other parameters in the simulation which can be modified, 
such as antenna type, propagation model, transmission range, MAC layer 
buffer size, and packet size, etc. We used the default settings provided by the 
simulator.
2) There are no assumptions on the processing time, and it takes a constant time 
to do computing operations.
3) The simulation covers the normal scenario and does not consider any threat 
model or anomaly behaviors done by clients or servers nodes. It is understood 
that such behavior will have some impact, and we will cover this point in 
more detail in Section 6.
4) Even if the requester demands a certificate from a principal which resides one 
hop away, the requester (client) will make a local broadcast regardless of 
target principal (i.e. node) location.
5) Maintenance and security parts of the protocol such as CRL dissemination or 
CA Key-refreshing are not implemented because they are out o f the scope of 
what we are measuring.
6) Random waypoint has a recently discovered problem which is described in 
detail in [69], but we are still using the old method for comparison with 
MOCA. However, the impact of using the modified Random waypoint model 
is not significant unless the total simulation time is very long, above 700 sec, 
and routing information is involved extensively, and this is not the case in our 
simulation.
7) Whenever a client receives duplicate partials, they are counted once.
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8) In the case of a client receiving a full certificate, it will be counted as if the 
client has received shares [ l . i ] . The impact of this assumption is that when the 
client receives further redundant shares which belong to [l..f], they will not be 
counted as mentioned above.
9) There are many variations and values each parameter can take. Our goal is to 
see the impact on reasonably selected values. Hence, pushing every parameter 
to its extreme value is not one of our goals. Thus, it is misleading to draw a 
generalized conclusion about the system with parameters that are far away 
from what we have used in this section.
10) Certificates are distributed uniformly into CACMAN clients; however, other 
distributions could enhance CACMAN performance.
5.3. Results and Discussion
In this section, we will analyze the results for every major configuration and the impact 
of changing the parameters that we care about. We will start by comparing CACMAN- 
Basic with MOCA.
5.3.1 MOCA and Flooding
Let us first discuss MOCA simulation results obtained from [70]. Fig. 11(a) shows the 
results of implementing the certification protocol using the pure flooding method [71], 
The X axis represents the number of received distinct CREPs, and their corresponding 
frequency is shown at the Y axis. For example, in the case of running the flooding 
protocol when the maximum speed is 10 m/s with a pause time of zero, about 50 requests 
received 25 unique CERPs, and about one or two requests did not get any replies at all. 
Indeed, flooding is effective; however, it injects a large number o f control packets into 
the network (e.g. imagine if threshold is set to 10 or less). Fig. 11(b) shows the effect of 
introducing the MOCA protocol. The impact is already reflected as a reduction on the 
frequency scale as compared to Flooding protocol. The peaks around different[5's are 
caused by MOCA when it uses cached route information to send unicast requests to
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MOCA servers, thus eliminating unnecessary flooding of the network. As we can see, the 
occurrences are still shifted to the right, which indicates a high rate o f success, but many 
redundant replies are also received due to the fact that MOCA floods the network if no 
sufficient routes to the CA servers exist in the client routing cache table.
350
Static Network —  
pause= 10s,speed= 1m /s —  
pause= 10s,speed= 5m /s - 
pause=10s,speed=1 Om/s —  
pause= 10s,speed= 20m /s —  
pause= 0ssspeed= 10m /s —- 






1510 20 25 300 5
No. of C R EPs Received
200 -------------
Flooding 
180 - beta=5 
beta=10 









5 15 20 25 300 10
No. of CR EPs Received
Fig. 11. (a) Flooding based certification protocol, (b) MOCA certification protocol on average speed = 
lOm/s and 0 pause time.
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5.3.2 CA CMAN-Basic and CA CMAN-X-Replies17
Fig. 12, Fig. 13, and Fig. 14 show the basic CACMAN protocol when the threshold is set 
to 5, 15, and 25 respectively. Each of those figures show the effect of mobility and cache 
size. The legends in these figures give the representations of "number of nodes-pause 
time-max speed (cache capacity) protocol." In Fig. 12, where t -  5 , few requests 
received insufficient replies, and the majority received an overwhelming number of 
replies. When we increased the threshold to 15, as in Fig. 13, the number of requests 
which got insufficient replies increased, and the cache size played a more important role. 
Notice that when the cache capacity increases to 150 and 225, as in Fig. 13 (b and c) 
respectively, the situation is much better as the number of unsuccessful requests 
decreases (remember that a request that receives fewer replies than the threshold is 
considered unsuccessful).
When the threshold is set to 25, the protocol performed badly regardless of the 
cache size and rarely gets more than a few successful requests out of 1000 requests sent 
at the simulation time.
From the figures above, we can draw some general conclusions about the 
performance of CACMAN-Basic with respect to threshold, cache capacity, and mobility:
1) The effect of mobility is not that significant regardless of the capacity and 
threshold and this is true even when other enhancements are used; therefore, 
we will usually show the results of mobility scenarios of maximum speed of 
lOm/s and 0 second pause time.
2) We have observed that, when t = 5 , the cache size of 75 is sufficient, and 
there is no noticeable benefit when we increase it.
17 The reason that we have distinguished the CACMAN-Basic protocol, which could be seen as 'X- 
Replies' with X =l, is that we consider the basic protocol as the reference point for many enhancements and 
comparisons.




150-0-1 (75) basic 
150-10-1 (75) basic 
150-0-10 (75) basic 
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-150-0-1 (150) basic 
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150-0-10 (150) basic 
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No. o f CREPs Received
Fig. 12. (t=5). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.
3) When t = 25, CACMAN-Basic is not capable of satisfactory performance, 
and the maximum cache size we used was not enough to get significant 
results.
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-150-10-1 (225) basic 
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No. o f CREPs Received
(d)
100
150-0-10 (75) basic 




10 15 20 25 300 5
No. o f CREPs Received
Fig. 12. Continued.
4) At t = 15, CACMAN-Basic performance, as expected, was between t = 5 and 
t = 25. Thus, it seems that gained performance is worth the increase in cache
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size, particularity when it increases from 75 to 150 shares. Finally, the peaks 
around the thresholds (very noticeable around t = 5 , less at t = 15 , and none 
at / = 25 ) are due to local cache hits. In that case, no request will be sent to 
the network and this is why the frequency at corresponding t is low, 
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150-10-1 (150) basic 
150-0-10(150) basic
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-150-0-20 (150) basic
• 150-10-20 (150) basic
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No. of CREPs R eceived
25 30
Fig. 13. (<=15). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.
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No. of CREPs Received
Fig. 13. Continued.
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— 150-0-1 (75) basic
 150-10-1 (75) basic
 150-0-10 (75) basic
  150-10-10 (75) basic
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No. o f CREPs Received
Fig. 14. (t=25). (a-c) Mobility effect with different cache sizes, (d) Cache capacity effect.
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Fig. 14 Continued.
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150-0-10 (225) basic 
-150-0-10 (225) 2-reps 
-150-0-10 (225) 4-reps 




No. of CREPs Received
25 30
Fig. 15. The effect of applying X-replies optimization, (a) sizes 75 and 150 (b) size 225. r=15.
Now, let us examine the performance gained when we use CACMAN-X-Replies 
variation. Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the impact of increasing the number o f replies when 
a CACMAN client receives a request that has more than one partial in the cache. As the 
size of the cache gets bigger and the number of allowed replies increases, more 
successful requests are getting through. Indeed, CACMAN-X-Replies are very useful 
even when t = 25 as shown in Fig. 15. This tells us that the needed partial probably is not
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the first one found in the clients' cache, and the more we increase the number of replies, 
the higher hit ratio we will obtain.
100
—— 150-0-10 (75) basic 
—  150-0-10 (150) basic 
-• -1 5 0 -0 -1 0 (7 5 )  2-reps 
150-0-10 (1 SO) 2-reps 
> 150-0-10 (150)4-reps 
150-0-10 (150) 8-reps 










0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
No. of C R E P s R eceived
150-0-10(225) 2-reps 
150-0-10 (225) 4-reps 
—t— 150-0-10 225 8-reps 
—— 150-0-10 (225) ali-reps
E 100
(b)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
No. of C R E P s R eceived
Fig. 16. The effect of applying X-replies optimization, (a) sizes 75 and 150. (b) size 225. t=25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 9
S.3.3 Comparing Flooding, MOCA, CACMAN-Basic, and CACMAN-X-Replies 
Figures shown in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, gives us a good visualization of how the 
numbers of CREPs are distributed and also gives an indication of the impact of a given 
parameter. However, it is difficult to get quantitative measures to answer questions like 
"How much performance do we gain if we change that parameter?" To answer these 
types o f questions, we need to have comparison criteria such that we can see which 
configuration is better in a given comparison factor. However, we will use the above 
mentioned way of plotting results accompanied with a supporting numerical value to get 
a more accurate picture. The performance criteria that we use in this dissertation are the 
following:
1) Packet Overhead: This is a very commonly used criteria to compare 
networking protocols, and it is interpreted in this context as the sum of data 
and control packets injected in a given simulation run.
2) Success Ratio: In this context, this is defined as the number of successful 
requests (ones that received at least t replies) over the total number of 
requests injected during the simulation time.
3) Overhead per Successful Request: This is defined as the ratio of packet 
overhead to the number of successful requests. In other words, on average, 
what is the packet overhead to send a successful request?
4) Adjusted Overhead per Request to Guarantee 100% Success Ratio: This 
measures the cost per request to guarantee 100% reliability of the system. 
Detailed discussion of this criterion will be shown at the end of this section.
In general, to make these measurements useful, compared systems should receive 
identical or similar workload, and as expected, a system with fewer packets overhead 
performs better. However, guaranteeing similar workload is not sufficient to draw a final 
conclusion because of the existence of important factors (i.e. success ratio). To clarify 
this point, consider system X with packet overhead of 1000 and success ratio of 90% and 
system Y with packet overhead of 100 and success ratio of 70%. As we can see, it is 
difficult to judge which system is better if we are considering both factors. To overcome
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the above dilemma, either we compare the systems by one factor at a time, using a
formula that covers the measurements of interest, or we agree on a common averaging
18formula and assign some weights to each factor . In this thesis, we will use the first two 
measures since the third one is subjective. In this section, we will evaluate the systems by 
showing the packet overhead of the tested configurations and their success ratio. The 
third and forth measurements will be shown at the end of this section.
T a b l e  III
P a c k e t  o v e r h e a d  f o r  so m e  se l e c t e d  c o n f ig u r a t io n s
M odel Average number o f  packets Ratio to flooding
Flooding 197601 100%
MOCA Closest unicast jB = 5 137666 69.7%
MOCA Closest unicast /? = 10 159039 80.5%
MOCA Closest unicast /3 = 15 170375 86.2%
MOCA Closest unicast = 20 177364 89.8%
MOCA Closest unicast f t  = 25 187063 94.7%
CACMAN basic,75 cache, t = 5 16516 8.4%
CACMAN basic,75 cache, t = 15 14028 7.1%
CACMAN basic, 150 cache, t = 15 19121 9.7%
CACMAN basic,225 cache, t = 15 22757 11.5%
CACMAN basic,225 cache, t = 25 21911 11.1%
CACMAN 2-reps, 150 cache, t = 15 25564 12.9%
CACMAN 2-reps,225 cache, t = 15 33569 17.0%
CACMAN 4-reps, 150 cache, t = 15 27838 14.1%
CACMAN 4-reps,225 cache, t = 15 39448 20.0%
CACMAN 8-reps, 150 cache, t = 15 28429 14.4%
CACMAN 8-reps,225 cache, t = 15 40199 20.3%
CACMAN all-reps, 150 cache, t = 15 28992 14.7%
CACMAN all-reps,225 cache, t = 15 40329 20.4%
CACMAN all-reps,300 cache, t = 15 51581 26.1%
18 The problem of evaluation systems performance has been discussed in depth in [38].
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Table III shows the ratio of various protocols' packet overhead to flooding 
overhead, and for example, MOCA saves about 30% when /3 = 5 compared to flooding, 
while CACMAN saves 92% compared to flooding when t = 5 (Remember j3 = a  + 1, but 
we assume a  = 0 to simplify the comparison. However, the reader can vary a , and, for 
example, can compare MOCA with /? = 10 to CACMAN with t = 5 by setting a  -  5 ). 
Furthermore, the overhead is also affected proportionally, in the case of CACMAN, by 
the cache size and the number of replies. CACMAN has a very low overhead compared 
to both MOCA and pure flooding because CACMAN never allows a request to propagate 
more than one hop.
If we switch the focus to the success ratio as a measure of performance, Fig. 17 
shows the success ratio for various scenarios19. We used the same technique used in [70] 
to plot the CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-X-Replies success ratios. The figures 
represent the fraction of successfully arrived CREPs as function o f time. According to 
these figures, flooding is indeed the most effective way to obtain a high success ratio, but 
at the price of higher packet overhead. CACMAN-Basic performs better, 92% to 99% 
depending on cache size, compared to MOCA, 91%, when t -  5 . The cache size has a 
noticeable effect in CACMAN-Basic, when t - 15, (the success ratio was 30%, 60%, and 
70% for cache sizes 75, 150, and 225, respectively), but this is not close, as expected, to 
Flooding (95% at ? = 15) but close to MOCA (77% at t = 15). However, the use of X- 
replies optimization tightens the gap between cache sizes and gives better results (8- 
replies with size cache size of 150 achieved 90% success ratio) compared to MOCA, 
which is close to Flooding.
These figures show some other important results. For example, observing the 
difference in time scale, CACMAN stabilizes (stops increasing) much faster than 
flooding and MOCA by as much as 16 times (e.g. CACMAN-Basic t5(75) in Fig. 17(c) 
stabilizes in 0.03 sec as compared to Flooding, in Fig. 17(a), where t= 5 which stabilizes
19 The threshold t is denoted by k  in [67].
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at 0.5sec). Such high performance is due to the fact that some partials are available at the 
local cache of the requester. Besides CACMAN initial requests never propagate more 
than one hop. Moreover, CACMAN receives CREPs much faster than MOCA and 
Flooding, which is another benefit of CACMAN. The previous figure is useful to choose 
the appropriate timeout value when a CREQ is sent. For example, for CACMAN-Basic 
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Fig. 17. Success Ratio with (a) Flooding, (b) MOCA Closest-Unicast, (c) CACMAN-Basic, (d) CACMAN 
X-replies.
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Fig. 17. Continued.
Finally, we would like conclude this analysis by summarizing the success ratio of 
all the parameters of interest for CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-X-Replies as shown in 
Fig. 18. It is clear that the size increase (from 75 to 300) of the cache and the number of 
replies (from 2 to all found partials) can boost the success ratio specifically when t is 
high (e.g. 25).
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Fig. 18. Success ratio for various scenarios (Max speed = lOm/sec, Pause time=0). Empty boxes mean the 
results has not been reported
5.3.4 The Effect o f  Removing CA Servers on CA CMAN Performance 
This section is to simulate the performance of CACMAN when some CA servers are 
down because of a sudden crash or a maintenance necessity. The aim of such a simulation 
is to see how the quality of the service (i.e. success ratio) is affected by the loss of some 
CA servers. We simulated this behavior by randomly choosing some CAs and turning 
them off for the entire simulation period.
Fig. 19 shows the impact of losing 10 and 20 CAs ( t  -1 5  ), a loss of one third and 
two thirds of the total number of CAs respectively as compared to when all CAs are 
functioning. We used CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-All-Replies clients with different
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cache sizes to see the tolerance of different configurations to such losses. The figures 
show, clearly, that a large cache size or the use of All-Reps variance plays a major role in 
making the service transparent (Fig. 19(e)). We mapped Fig. 19 to Table IV and Table V 
for a clearer analysis.
T a b l e  IV
Su c c e ss  r a t io  w h e n  so m e  C A  se r v e r s  c r a sh  (C A C M A N -B A S IC )
# CAs 150 cache 225 cache
30 (default) 63.3% 73.9%
20 51.3% 65.8%
10 40.0% 60.7%
T a b l e  V
Su c c e ss  r a t io  w h e n  so m e  C A  se r v e r s  c r a sh  (C A C M A N -A l l -R e p l ie s )
#CAs 150 cache 225 cache
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Fig. 19. Visualization o f the impact o f CA crashes.(a) CACMAN-Basic with cache size 75, (b) with cache 
size 150, (c) with cache size 225. (d) CACMAN-All-Replies with cache size 150, (e) cache size 225. All 
with /=15 and max speed of 10 m/sec.




150-0-10(150) 20 MOCAs 
150-0-10 (150) 10 MOCAs100
SGOO
5 10 15 200 25 30
No. of CREPs Received
120
150-0-10 (225) basic 
150-0-10 (225) 20 MOCAs 




5 100 15 20 25 30
No. of CREPs Received
Fig. 19. Continued.
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Fig. 19. Continued.
5.3.5 Cache-Focus Optimization
In Section 4.5.3, we described the rationale behind Cache-Focus (CF) optimization. Here, 
we will show the impact of implementing Cache-Focus into the protocol performance. 
We have applied this enhancement on CACMAN-Basic and CACMAN-All-Reps with
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the values o f 1, 2, 4, and 8. This means in each simulation run, every client will focus on 
caching partials issued by one CA (i.e. CF=1), any two CAs (i.e. CF=2), and so on.
The results show an initial improvement when CF=1, but it starts to be less 
effective as CF increases, and when CF=8, the hit ratio is almost equal to CACMAN- 
Basic as shown in Table VI. The reason why a small CF value is beneficial is because it 
increases the chances of finding a partial for the target by allowing only shares that 
belong to the chosen CF to be exist at any client. For example, in the case when the cache 
size is 150, a partial is always found (remember we have a total of 150 participants), and 
the hope now is to find t neighbors with different cache-focus choices to guarantee 
distinct replies. On the other hand, CACMAN-All-Reps eliminates the benefits o f this 
optimization by sending many replies and hoping that some of them will match the 
needed request as shown in Table VII.
T a b l e  V I 
C a c h e -fo c u s  f o r  C A C M A N -B a sic
Protocol 75 cache 150 cache
1 Basic 37.7% 63.3%
1 CF 55.3% 83.1%
2 CF 53.5% 82.3%
4 CF 53.5% 81.9%
8 CF 34.3% 59.6%
T a b l e  V II  
C a c h e -fo c u s  f o r  C A C M A N -A l l -R e p s
I Protocol 75 cache 150 cache
1 All reps 51.1% 78.9%
1 CF 55.0% 80.0%
2 CF 53.1% 81.2%
4 CF 51.7% 77.7%
8 CF 47.4% 77.9%
5.3.6 Lazy-Replies with Cancellation
In Section 4.5.2, we mentioned that the goal of the lazy replies technique is to reduce the 
amount of dropped packets due to the packet-storm-effect (i.e. packets arrive to a single 
node from many sources at the same time). We implemented this enhancement by
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delaying CREPs by 10, 40, 160, 640 milliseconds. The simulation shows that there is no 
significant gain in the performance because the CACMAN's low packet overhead reduces 
the impact from such situation. However, even if CACMAN has immunity from the 
packet-storm-effect, as compared to MOCA and Flooding, there is still a good reason to 
implement the other variation, i.e. Lazy-Replies with Cancellation, to reduce the amount 
of redundant replies by allowing the client to send a "Cancel" message once it has the 
sufficient number of CREPs. Fig. 20 illustrates the effect of implementing various delay 
values. The goal of this enhancement is to group the number of CREPs as close as 
possible to the threshold. This will not affect the success ratio, but it positively reduces 
the unnecessary CREPs. Fig. 20(a) suggests that there is no significant difference 
between a 10 and 40ms delay; however, lengthening the interval to 160 and 640 
milliseconds pushes the number of replies close to the threshold (here, 7 = 15) . The 
figure also suggests that there is no significant difference, again, between 160 and 640 ms 
delay. However, CACMAN-All-Reps, Fig. 20(b), shows the same results when 10 and 
40ms values are examined despite a noticeable gap between 160 and 640 ms delay. 
Remember that the cancellation message will not be sent until the client which has sent 
the CREQ gets sufficient CREPs. In the case of CACMAN-All-Reps, if  a CACMAN 
client has more than one CREP, each one will be scheduled for transmission, and a 
cancellation message will purge CREPs which have not been sent yet. This explains why 
CACMAN-All-Reps benefited more from this enhancement as compared to CACMAN- 
Basic.
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Fig. 20. Visualization o f different delay values (t=15) (a) CACMAN-Basic (b) CACMAN-All-Reps.
Fig. 21 shows the packet overhead for both scenarios. For example, in the case of 
CACMAN-All-Reps with lazy reply interval 640 ms, there was 55% less packet overhead 
compared to 10 ms delay.
Finally, we should mention that the amount of reduction of packet overhead is 
also a function of the threshold. Intuitively, when t = 25, there is a little reduction since 
the amount of redundancy is less compared to t = 5 .












0 .0%  -
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Fig. 21. Packet overhead for different maximum-delay values (normalized to 10ms delay).
5.4. Single Measure
In all of our previous discussions, measurements of Flooding, MOCA, and CACMAN 
performance were based primarily on the success ratio and packet overhead. We have 
shown that it is desirable to increase the former and decrease the latter. We will conclude 
this section by showing that both factors can be merged to a single one as described in 
Section 5.3.3. Table VIII lists packet overhead per successful request and the adjusted 
packet overhead to guarantee the 100% success ratio for a request assuming a client will 
use flooding if the first attempt was not successful. That single measurement is calculated 
by the following formula:
AO = (hit ratio x POSR) + ((1- hit ratio) *FOR)
AO  stands for "Adjusted Overhead to ensure 100% reliability" and POSR is "Packet 
Overhead per Successful Request" and FOR is "Flooding overhead/request."
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T a b l e  VIII
POSR AND AO VALUES FOR VARIOUS CONFIGURATIONS
Protocol POSR AO
Flooding 199.597 199.597
MOCA (7 = 15) 218.430 214.290
CACMAN-Basic t =15,  cache size 75 37.210 138.380
CACMAN-Basic 1 = 15, cache size 150 30.207 92.373
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, Lazy 40ms 30.538 74.662
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, Lazy 640ms 21.486 63.698
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 1 FC 40.764 67.607
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 2 FC 41.015 69.084
CACMAN-Basic t = 15, cache size 150, 4 FC 41.340 69.984
CACMAN-Basic 1 = 15, cache size 225 30.794 74.859
CACMAN-2 Reps t = 15, cache size 150 34.499 77.260
CACMAN-2 Reps t = 15, cache size 225 39.680 64.307
C ACM AN-4 Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150 35.193 69.554
CACMAN-4 Reps t = 15, cache size 225 44.675 62.801
CACMAN-8 Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150 35.941 70.145
CACMAN-8 Reps t = 15, cache size 225 45.423 63.153
CACMAN-A11 Reps t = 15, cache size 150 36.745 71.107
CACMAN-All-Reps t =15, cache size 150, Lazy 40ms 44.145 61.711
CACMAN-All-Reps t - 15, cache size 150, Lazy 640ms 20.372 35.427
CACMAN-All-Reps t = 15, cache size 150, 1 FC 41.542 73.153
CACMAN-All-Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150, 2 FC 41.665 71.356
CACMAN-All-Reps 1 = 15, cache size 150, 4 FC 43.061 79.065
CACMAN-A11 Reps t - 15, cache size 225 45.313 62.285
Flooding and MOCA have the highest packet overhead per successful request. 
CACMAN with lazy replies of 640ms has the least in both variations as shown in Table 
VIII.
5.5. Concluding Remarks
From the previous discussion, we summarize our simulation results into the following 
points:
1) The effect of the threshold is noticeable, and the more it increases, the less the 
likelihood of getting all partials from the first attempt.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
2) The number of replies received per request is still larger than required except 
when t = 25, in which case the number of successful replies is reduced 
dramatically. However, when we applied the X-replies variation, the number 
of successful CREPs increased noticeably.
3) The mobility effect is not that significant since CACMAN utilizes local 
broadcasts, and mobility will have a significant effect when routing 
information is involved in the protocol.
4) Cache size obviously has an impact on performance. However, going from a 
cache size of 75 to 150 is more significant and effective than going from 150 
to 225, and this is consistent in other thresholds and max speeds, which 
suggests 150 as the best compromise between cache size and hit ratio.
5) Techniques like Cache-Focus and Lazy Replies with Cancellation can 
increase the performance of CACMAN without noticeable increase in 
overhead.
6) CACMAN has much faster response time (about 16 times faster) as compared 
to flooding and MOCA due to the fact that some partials are available at the 
local cache of the requester. Besides, CACMAN requests never propagate 
more than one hop.
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SECTION 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This section is the conclusion of this dissertation. We will summarize the motivation for 
our work, the problem we addressed, and our proposed solution to offering secure and 
highly available CA service in MANET. We will then present a roadmap for enhancing 
and extending our work in the future. The section is organized into two subsections: 
Section 6.1 is the summary and conclusion of this work, and Section 6.2 is an elaboration 
about further extensions and enhancements.
6.1. Summary and Conclusion
The introduction of MANET has reshaped our thinking about many problems that 
researchers have faced in computer systems that caused them to seek genuine solutions 
due to MANET's unique and distinctive characteristics such as dynamic topology 
changes combined with power restrictions, transmission range, and limited computational 
capabilities.
In this dissertation, we started by showing that security is a fundamental part of 
MANET, yet it has not been seriously addressed until recently. Every aspect o f MANET 
is inherently vulnerable to wider security attacks compared to wired networks. Frequency 
jamming, routing protocol disruption, snooping, or straight physical compromising of 
nodes (e.g. [41], [57], [73], [28]) are just a few examples of some security problems that 
have a wide spectrum of possible solutions in MANET. Quality of Service (QoS), too, 
has been tackled in MANET from a variety of perspectives (e.g. [13], [14], [27], [45]), 
and guaranteeing availability of vital services is yet another difficult MANET problem 
that requires specialized solutions for this environment.
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an important service that provides a framework 
for a system using public-key primitives and operations to achieve security functions 
such as Authentication, Authorization, Privacy, Integrity, and Non-repudiation.
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Certificates, as a major PKI component, are used for encrypting and/or signing many 
vital applications, such as authentication, exchange of routing info, encrypting or signing 
emails, and much more. A Certificate Authority (CA), at the heart of any PKI system, is 
usually used to organize, store, and issue those certificates. Furthermore, adopting PKI in 
MANET is not an easy task since providing a reliable and secure service is much more 
challenging as compared to well-connected and reliable wired networks. We discussed 
solutions proposed to adapt CA in MANET (Section 3), and most of these solutions rely 
on secret sharing mechanisms (Section 2.4) to increase security and availability. These 
solutions assume installing the CA service in just one node will make it vulnerable, and 
an exact replication o f the CA will make the situation even worse.
Kong et al. proposed Ubiquitous and Robust Security Architecture (URSA) 
(Section 3.3) to provide pervasive CA services by making all (n  ) nodes in the network 
share CA functionality. The private-key of the service is shared by all nodes, but any t 
member can form a coalition to sign certificates which are trusted by the whole network. 
The problem of choosing a low threshold value to guarantee availability, in addition to 
other technical issues, reduces its practicality.
We described Mobile CA (MOCA) (Section 3.5) protocol and showed that it has 
been introduced as the counterpart of the Cornell Online Certificate Authority 
(COCA)(Section 3.4) framework, but with consideration to MANET's unique properties. 
MOCA is a mobile node in the MANET, and it is selected to provide distributed CA 
functionality. When a client wants to obtain a certificate, it sends Certificate Request 
(CREQ) packets to at least t (usually more) MOCA servers and waits for a reply. Any 
MOCA that receives a CREQ will reply by sending a Certification Reply (CREP) packet 
containing its partial signature. Once the client receives at least t valid CREPs, it can 
reconstruct the whole certificate. CREQ and CREP have been embedded in Route 
Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP) messages that are found in on-demand ad-hoc 
routing protocols like AODV [63] and DSR [16] to reduce the amount of overhead 
packets. MOCA increases availability by letting clients send more than t unicast CREQ 
just in case. Additionally, to avoid flooding the network, MOCA clients inspect the route
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table to see if  any cached routes to MOCAs are available, making flooding a last resort 
when the cached routes are less than a given threshold.
We have two major concerns about MOCA which we believe may reduce the 
usability o f the framework. The first concern is that the number of MOCA nodes is 
relatively high, about 10 to 20% of the total number of participants. We believe that this 
does not come without some consequences, such as CA synchronization and key 
refreshing overhead. The second concern is that the number of control packets, the sum 
of CREQ and CREP, generated by MOCA is high compared to Flooding. In the best case, 
MOCA saves about 30% of packet overhead when t = 5 and only about 5% when t = 25.
We started our work, "CAching Certificates in Mobile Ad-hoc networks" 
(CACMAN), by a preliminary evaluation using Monte Carlo simulation presented in [8] 
but without any consideration of mobility. Then, we revised our work [9], [10] and used a 
more realistic simulator i.e. NS-2 [47]. The aim of our research in this dissertation is to 
minimize the burden of adapting CA services in MANET by minimizing the packet 
overhead and maintaining high availability of the service at the same time. This has been 
achieved by making clients share some responsibilities with CA servers by cooperatively 
caching some certificates generated by CA servers. We showed how the characteristics of 
certificates have made caching a reasonable solution to the availability problem. Our 
cashing-based framework has addressed the security and performance challenges of 
providing CA services in MANET. Moreover, we suggested techniques with minimal 
overhead that help achieve our main goal, availability, without compromising MANET 
security. We showed the feasibility of our framework and compared it to other related 
systems using the NS-2 simulator which gave us more insight into the problem from the 
performance perspective.
In CACMAN, each client that wants to obtain the certificate o f other client(s) to 
establish a secure communication or to encrypt some messages will search its own cache 
for a complete certificate of the subject. If found, then the request is completed; 
otherwise, it will identify the missing partials and proceed by making a local broadcast, 
but if it happens that it has a short route to the subject in question, it sends the CREQ to
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that subject instead of making a local broadcast. Every client that receives a CREQ 
message inspects its cache for a possible hit. It sends a CREP back to the sender if a full 
or partial certificate(s) is found for the subject. After that, the client waits for a specified 
time; if it receives sufficient responses then it reconstructs the certificate. If  the request 
initiator times out because insufficient partials have been received or the reconstruction 
has failed, then the client may try to contact CA servers by flooding the network or by 
sending unicast messages if  it has sufficient routes to them. Otherwise, it reports a failure 
to the client or retries later.
In our simulations, we used the most recent build o f NS-2 to simulate the same 
scenario used in MOCA to ensure fair comparisons. Each configuration was replicated at 
least three times. For CACMAN protocol, we used four cache sizes -  (75, 150, 225, and 
300 share slots) - and four thresholds for key construction -  (5, 15, 20, and 25). The 
results show CACMAN can enhance the CA service, and we summarize our findings into 
the following points:
1) The threshold had noticeable effect on performance. Higher thresholds, 
though increasing system security, will make the likelihood of getting all 
partials from the first attempt lower. And to a great extent, CACMAN is able 
to tolerate high threshold better than MOCA.
2) The number of replies received per request is still larger than required except 
when t -  25, in which case the number of successful replies is reduced 
dramatically. However, when we applied the X-replies variation, the number 
of successful CREPs increased noticeably.
3) Mobility does not have a significant effect on CACMAN performance due to 
its utilization of local broadcasts to obtain service.
4) Cache size plays a major role in CACMAN. Increasing the size from 75 
shares to 150 is significant and effective. However, going from 150 to 225 has 
lesser impact, and this holds regardless of the threshold and/or maximum 
speeds, which makes 150 ideal in terms of cache size and hit ratio tradeoffs 
for the examined environment.
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5) CACMAN has a very significant reduction in packet overhead; for example, 
MOCA saves about 30% over Flooding when threshold is set to 5, while 
CACMAN saves 92% at the same threshold. Furthermore, the overhead is 
also affected proportionally, in the case of CACMAN, by the cache size and 
the number of replies.
6) Various proposed enhancements have noticeable impact on CACMAN 
performance. X-Replies, Lazy-Replies with Cancellation, and Cache-Focus 
played a pivotal role in enhancing the framework availability.
7) CACMAN has faster response time (up to 16 times) than flooding and MOCA 
due to its caching techniques; moreover, CACMAN requests never propagate 
more than one hop.
8) The framework's ability to maintain high availability with much less network 
overhead allows many other protocols that depend on public-key operations to 
be introduced in MANET without the fear of increasing the overall overhead 
caused by security.
We have investigated other topics associated with our framework such as the 
impact of removing CA servers from CACMAN without significant loss in performance. 
The impact of CA key refreshing on the framework and how to overcome the 
consequences thereof have also been investigated. "Partial certificates compaction and 
redundancy removal" and "cache replacement policies" have been conceptually discussed 
to complement our framework. We also analyzed the impact of applying different 
revocation schemes. Enhancements to the basic protocol such as Cache-Focus and Lazy- 
Replies with Cancellation has proven to be useful to boost the framework further. Finally, 
CACMAN deployment in hybrid environments has been discussed and shown to be 
useful as well.
In conclusion, this dissertation has the following major contribution:
CACMAN is able to reduce network overhead associated with threshold
based CA service up to 92% as compared to related work with very short
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response time (about 16 times faster). The dependency on CA servers has 
been reduced and CACMAN is able (in the simulation) to tolerate as much 
as 20 inoperative CA servers out o f  30 (due to crash or offline operations) 
without noticeable decrease in the performance. By separating availability 
from  security, which is an inherent problem o f threshold-based solutions 
and in CACAMAN, we are able to alleviate that problem.
6.2. Future Extensions
Here, we will present different possible directions that could be investigated for further 
expansion of our work in this dissertation.
6.2.1 New Communication Paradigm and Applications
In this thesis, our focus and discussion was in the domain of caching certificates and how 
to speedup this operation with less overhead. If we take a closer look into the CACMAN 
request operation, the sequence of a transaction will always follow a one-to-many-to-one 
[22] communication paradigm. We call the first part of the previous term (i.e. one-to- 
many) "Quorum-cast" since we are trying to reach a threshold of servers. Quorum-cast is 
considered a generalization of multicasting, and more details can be found in [29], [24], 
Carter et al. [22] have discussed some other applications, besides MOCA (Section 3.5), 
for one-to-many-to-one, such as version 4 of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [50],
The introduction of a caching component, as we did in CACMAN, could bring 
more efficiency into one-to-many-to-one types of applications since clients 
collaboratively help the servers. However, not all application are cache compatible, for 
example, consider NTP where it is makes no sense to cache servers' replies. Finding other 
potential applications that could benefit from our introduction of caching as part o f the 
paradigm is one of our future goals.
6.2.2 Low-density Topologies
Section 5 is dedicated to examine the performance part of CACMAN and compare it to 
related work. However, we did not have much freedom to control many of the simulation
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parameters because a fair comparison is impossible unless we test both protocols under 
identical conditions.
Thus, it is interesting to investigate on performance of CACMAN into different 
topologies and node sizes. The topology we used in studying CACMAN is a 1000m2 
area. Although this size and the total number of nodes (i.e. 150) is common in MANET 
simulations, we think it is relatively dense. We think that it is worth extending the 
simulation to cover larger, hence lower-density areas with the same number of nodes 
scenarios so that we can see how to tune CACMAN to keep its high performance. Our 
preliminary investigations show that the performance of CACMAN is expected to 
improve if we allow a CREQ to propagate a little bit more than what is currently allowed 
(e.g. TTL = 2 instead of local broadcast). Another technique worth trying is to use some 
probabilistic forwarding scheme (i.e. the CREQ is forwarded to next hop with a given 
probability) to find a balance point between maximum hit ratio and minimum overhead. 
However, possibly other techniques like those discussed in Section 4.4 could lead to 
different results.
6.2.3 Certificate Usage Distribution and Scalability
In this dissertation, we assumed that all certificates have similar popularity and are 
distributed uniformly in client caches. This was also the case when a CACMAN client 
makes a CREQ in which the probability of requesting a certificate is uniformly 
distributed. However, this could not be the case in practice because of reference locality 
(e.g. temporal or geographical). Although some empirical studies regarding the demand 
of multimedia objects show that accessing patterns follow Zipf distribution [45], we 
cannot say that is the case for certificates, and to the best of our knowledge, such a study 
is not available. Investigating certificate access and usage patterns in large scale 
enterprises or on the Internet scale is an important topic to be studied. We think that 
knowing how certificates are used and exchanged between principals will enable us to 
make better plans for cache sizes and most likely will reduce the amount of memory 
required as compared to the uniform distribution that we have assumed in this 
dissertation.
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Another benefit of finding a distribution model for certificate requests is 
scalability since the cache size usually cannot cope with the dramatic increase of the 
number of existing certificates and nodes. Currently, CACMAN memory requirements 
increase linearly with the number of existing certificates, given that we have fixed all 
other parameters. It is known that the lack of locality will adversely affect the scalability 
of any application that utilizes caches to increase its performance.
6.2.4 Analytical Model
Another interesting issue is building an analytical model that captures the most important 
parameters involved in the framework. Such a model will enable us to find optimum 
values among conflicting parameters to satisfy the application requirements. In 
CACMAN, we think building a generic topology-independent analytical model is worth 
being investigated. For example, a model that takes parameters such as cache size, total 
number of objects (i.e. certificates), threshold, objects distribution, and the number of 
accessible neighbors into consideration to find, say, the hit ratio.
6.2.5 Miscel laneous Issues
Here, we briefly list other noteworthy issues. Some are considered easy from the 
implementation point of view, but the problem of finding the right assumptions may be 
not that simple.
1) Cross-Layered10 Secure Framework: It is interesting to investigate how to 
integrate CACMAN in a framework that addresses all identified security 
threats in MANET and provide a single practical solution for them. Such 
framework is security-centric, where security features and sub-protocols exist 
in every layer of MANET stack. We urge researchers to study the possibility 
and problems which may arise by such integration.
20 M. Conti et al. brought the issue o f the importance of cross-layering in MANET, and in their model, 
security indeed is a vertical element of the MANET stack [23].
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2) Integration o f  Detection System'. As a component of the previous point, 
misbehaving nodes can decrease the usability of CACMAN by injecting bad 
partials. Using verification techniques, honest CACMAN clients can discover 
such partials, and they may report the abuse incidents to CA servers, and if the 
CA collects many complains about the same client, it may revoke the 
certificate of the malicious node and broadcast such a decision. It is 
interesting to investigate the details of this protocol.
3) Generalization o f  the Underlying Network Infrastructure: CACMAN has been 
designed with MANET in mind. However, it is possible to extend it to other 
environments such as Internet level peer-to-peer overlay networks which is a 
good candid environment, though the parameters will be adapted accordingly.
4) CRL Performance: It is important to evaluate the performance impact of 
various CRL schemes when applied into MANET environments to see how 
long it takes to disseminate CRL information to the entire network.
5) Practical Key Refreshing Time fo r  CA Servers: Key refreshing has inherent 
tradeoff between communication overhead, i.e. at least 0 ( n 2),  and the 
vulnerability created by allowing the intruder more time to compromise the 
system if the window of vulnerability is too long. Knowing the impact of 
choosing different key refreshing intervals on CACMAN performance is 
important since it will affect the freshness of cached results, as we discussed it 
in Section 4.7.1.
6) The Efficiency o f  Exchanging Caches Contents Procedure: This point could 
be tackled based on the findings obtained from the previous point. Key- 
refreshing frequently will allow many incompatible shares issued in different 
epochs to exist in CACMAN clients' caches, which means additional 
overhead. Using the protocol described in Section 4.7.2 would alleviate the 
situation, and it will be interesting to get a quantitative result for the procedure 
performance.
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A.I Network Simulator (NS-2)
"NS is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking research. NS provides substantial 
support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless 
(local and satellite) networks. NS began as a variant of the REAL21 network simulator in 
1989 and has evolved substantially over the past few years. In 1995 NS development was 
supported by DARPA through the VINT22 project at LBL, Xerox PARC, UCB, and 
USC/ISI. Currently NS development is support through DARPA with SAMAN and 
through NSF with CONSER, both in collaboration with other researchers including 
ACIRI. NS has always included substantial contributions from other researchers, 
including wireless code from the UCB Daedelus and CMU Monarch projects and Sun 
Microsystems" [47].
NS-2 has been implemented using OTCL [68] and C++ programming languages. 
OTCL is an object-oriented variant of TCL (Tool Command Language) and it is designed 
for writing scripts and configurations files rapidly and without any necessary compilation 
but with the shortcoming of execution speed since it is an interpreted language. C++ is 
used for writing NS-2 core, protocols, and any code that does not change frequently. Both 
languages are linked using some API that allows both languages to see each other 
variables and objects at run time.
21 See http://www.cs.comell.edu/skeshav/real/overview.html.
22 See http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/vint/index.html.
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A.II Technology and Environment Used in CACMAN Implementation
We were able to build NS-2 version 2.27 successfully (after some effort) at the ODU 
Computer Science Department on two Sun Fire™ V880 (each equipped with 8 
UltraSPARC processors, 32GB RAM, and Solaris™ 9 OS). We have followed an Object 
Oriented Design approach to develop the framework using C++ and benefited from its 
Standard Template Library (STL) though it was not recommend to be used in NS for 
portability reasons. GCC 3.3.2 was used to compile about 2000 lines o f source code for 
the simulation and configuration. Perl 5.8.0 was used to analyze and aggregate 67 GB of 
trace file generated by our simulation. MS-Office™ 2003 suite used to plot figures, draw 
diagrams, and typesetting the dissertation.
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APPENDIX B 
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF CACMAN
This appendix contains snapshots from CACMAN design and implementation. Static 
diagram is shown in Appendix B.I. Appendix B.II contains packet types and formats for 
some CACMAN messages. Appendix B.III is the OTCL scripts for configuring and 
running the simulation. Finally, Appendix B.IV contains C++ code of a one of the 
CACMETN core methods.
B.I Class Diagram
Fig. 22 is Unified Modeling Language (UML) static23 representation of CACMAN 
design and it summaries some important facts about the work. We have implemented 
other protocols as a proof of concept prototypes. Class "Agent" is the root that all other 
protocol will derive from and it contains some virtual methods that may be overridden by 
each protocol. In our simulation the CA servers are just MOCA servers and they do not 
playing in additional rule besides sending CREPs whenever they receiver any requests. 
CACMAN client has an important member, i.e. "sharesCache", of type "CertCache" 
which is responsible for managing partials.
23 The Dynamic Model of the system is partially shown in Section 4.3
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Agent
+threshold : int 
#servers 
sim mode
+command(in args : *char): int 






■certCache_ : map 





4 -de lega te : int
MOCA client




-threshold : int 
-maxsize : int 
-totalnodes: int 
-currentsize : int 




+addShare(in c e rt jd  : int, in sh a re jd  : in t) : void 
+removeShare(): bool 
+getSize(): int
+find(in c e rt jd  : int, in sh a re jd  : int)
+isFull(): bool 
+fillCache(): void
+fillCacheColored(in CF : in t) : void 
+findAII(in c e rt jd  : in t) : set 
+dump()
Fig. 22. Static structure of important CACMAN modules
We also summarize important methods and properties in Table IX for a better 
understanding of Fig. 22.
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T a b le  IX 
M e t h o d s  a n d  P r o p e r t i e s  su m m ery
M ethod or property Purpose
Agent: Threshold Security threshold o f the system.
Agent:: servers Holds the addresses of CA servers.
Agent: :sim mode Node type (e.g. CACMAN, MOCA, ...etc).
Agent:: Command Receives commands passed from OTCL in string format. 
The method should be overridden and each protocol has 
its own set of commands.
Agent:: CREQ Certificate Request expects principal ID as a parameter. 
The method should be handled by each protocol 
according to its technique of sending CREQs
1 Agent: :recv Packets received by the agent, usually CREQ, are passed 
to this method. The packet contains the protocol header 
besides IP header.
CACMAN:: sharesCache This object is the cache manager o f CACMAN agent and 
more details about its contract is shown under CertCache 
below.
CACMAN: :certCache A hash table for outstanding requests
1 CertCache: Threshold The cache manager needs to now the threshold since this 
information is important for share combining.
CertCache: :maxsize Maximum size for the cache measured by number of 
shares.
CertCache: xurrentsize Contains the current number of cached shares.
CertCache: :myfocus A set that contains ID numbers of CAs which this client 
will focus on (used in Cache-Focus enhancement only)
CertCache: :CF The size of the cache focus group.
CertCache:: fathercache It is the superset that contains all possible shares. Its 
replications are used for initializing new caches.
CertCache: mum of servers Used by "father cache"
CertCache: :addShare Adds a share to CACMAN client cache.
CertCache: :removeShare Remove a share from CACMAN client cache. The 
manger will the algorithm specified in Section 4.7.4 for 
choosing the victim.
CertCache:: find Search for a specific certificate.
CertCache ::isFull Returns true if the certificate cache is full.
CertCache:: fillCache Initializes the cache randomly with partials based on 
some constraints (e.g. number of servers, size, and CF 
usage)
CertCache:: fillCacheColored Called by "fillCache" when cache-focus is in use.
CertCache: :fmdAll Returns a set that contains the shares of the specified 
certificates.
CertCache: :dump Print cache contents for debug purpose.
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Fig. 23. CACMAN's packet format. RT stands for request type (CREQ=0, CREP=1, RCancel=2). Request 
TS is to hold the timestamp when the CREQ is issued and used for setting various timers and statistics. Cert 
ID is used to identify the CREQ and to tell what certificate is inside the payload if  used in CREP messages. 
Share ID is to tell which share is in the CREP payload. Certificate Contents holds certificate data. The 
implementation uses a slight modified design of this format.
B.III An Example of a Simulation Scenario
Fig. 24 shows CACMAN main script used for running NS-2 simulation.
# cacman.tcl
# = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
# Laith Al-Sulaiman (lal-sula@cs.odu.edu)
# Old Dominion University, Computer Science Department
# 2005
# = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =






set v a l (11) LL
set val(ant) Antenna/OmniAntenna
Fig. 24. CACMAN main script written in OTCL.
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set val(x) 1000 # X dimension of the topography
set val(y) 1000 # Y dimension of the topography
set val(ifqlen) 50 # max packet in ifq
set val(seed) 0.0
set val(adhocRouting) AODV
set val(nn) 20 # default number of nodes
set val(thresh) 5 # default threshold
set val(cp) "scens/moca-sen.tel" ;
set val(sc) "scens/scen-lOOOxlOO0-20-0-10-1" ;
set val(stop) 600 •# simulation time
set val(logAgent) ON
#  = = = = = = = = = = = = =
# Main Program
#
# new seed and all streams will be derived from that seed 
global defaultRNG 
$defaultRNG seed 10877
# parse the command line
for {set i 0} {$i < $argc } { } {
set [lindex $argv $i] [lindex $argv [expr $i+l]] 
set i [expr $i + 2]
}
# read the total number of nodes, threshold, and scenario file 
if { [info exists n]} {
set val(nn) $n
}
if {[info exists t]} { 
set val(thresh) $t
}
if {[info exists sc]} { 
set val(sc) $sc
}
# set number of servers 
if { $val(nn) >= 150 } {




# in case of we have 300 nodes make val (servers) = 50 
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puts "servers = $val(servers)\nthreshold = $val(thresh)\nnn = 
$val(nn)\nfile = $val(sc)"
# Initialize Global Variables
#
# define simulation mode (CACMAN, MOCA, COCA, KONG) and threshold
set simulation_mode "CACMAN" 
set threshold $val(thresh)
# create simulator instance
set ns_ [new Simulator]
# setup topography object 
set topo [new Topography]
# prepare the trace file which is derived from the command line params 




$topo load_flatgrid $val(x) $val(y)
# Create God
set god_ [create-god $val(nn)]
#
# define how node should be created
#
# this proc is to attach nodes to the trace descriptor 




if { $val(logAgent) == "ON" } { 
set T [new Trace/Generic]
$T target [$ns_ set nullAgent_]
$T attach $tracefd 





#global node setting 
Fig. 24. Continued.
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$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(adhocRouting) \ 







-channelType $val(chan) \ 
-topolnstance $topo \





# Create the specified number of nodes [$val(nn)] and "attach" them
# to the channel.
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
set node_($i) [$ns_ node]
$node_($i) random-motion 0 ;# disable random motion
}
#
# Define traffic model
#
puts "Loading connection pattern from $val(cp) ..." 
source $val(cp)
# Define node movement model
#
puts "Loading scenario file from $val(sc) ..."
# the content of that source is shown in the next figure 
source $val(sc)
#
# Tell all nodes when the simulation ends
#
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {
$ns_ at $val(stop).002 "$node_($i) reset";
}
$ns_ at $val(stop).02 "puts \"NS EXITING...\" ; close $tracefd; $ns 
halt"
puts "nn $val(nn) x $val(x) y $val(y) rp $val(adhocRouting)" 
puts "prop $val(prop) ant $val(ant)"
Fig. 24. Continued.
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# run the simulaiton
puts "Starting Simulation. M
$ns run
Fig. 24. Continued.
The script that controls requests and agents creation is shown below.
# create CA servers
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(servers) } {incr i} { 
set moca_($i) [new Agent/Cacman "S"]
$ns_ attach-agent $node_([expr $val(nn) - $i - 1]) $moca_($i)
# let the clients print 
addTracer $moca_($i)
# it may need i t !
#$moca_($i) cacman2dsr 
$moca ($i) cacman2aodv
# special case for COCA
if { $simulation_mode == "COCA" } {
puts "COCA mode adding servers to cocas";
# in COCA case also add them each athor
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(servers) } {incr i} { 





# new radnom generator requests 
set r [new RNG]
# create clients
for {set i 0} {$i < [expr $val(nn) - $val(servers)] } {incr i} {
# the extra param after C is used by cacman only 
set cac_($i) [new Agent/Cacman "C" ]
if { $simulation_mode == "CACMAN" } {
# specify cache size and type
#$cac_($i) createcache [expr int($val(nn)* 0.30 * $val(thresh)) ]
$cac_($i) createcache [expr int($val(nn)* 0.50 ) ]
#$cac_($i) createcacheColored [expr int($val(nn)* 1.00 ) ] "8" ;
}
$ns_ attach-agent $node_($i) $cac_($i)
$cac_($i) cacman2aodv
# this is also correct $node_($i) attach $cac_($i) 
for {set j 0} {$j < $val(servers)} {incr j} {
$cac_($i) AddMocas $moca_($j)
}_______________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 25. Scenario configuration script.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 9
# let the clients print 
addTracer $cac_($i)
}
# how many requests will be sent 
if { $val (nn) >= 300 } {
set totalreqs 200 
} elseif { $val(nn) == 150 } { 
set totalreqs 100 
} else {
puts "Warning you are using not standard value\nall clients will 
send 10 rquests"
set totalreqs [expr $val(nn) - $val(servers)]
}
# schedule 1000 reqeusts (i.e. 10 CREQ/client) 
for {set i 0} {$i < $totalreqs } {incr i} {
for {set j 0} {$j < 10} {incr j} {




B.IV CACMAN Certificate Reply (CREP) Implementation
void CacmanClientAgent::recv (Packet *pkt, Handler *) {
// Access the IP header for the received packet: 
hdr_ip *hdrip = hdr_ip::access (pkt);
// Access the Cacman header for the received packet: 
hdr_cacman *hdr = hdr_cacman::access (pkt);
// cacman should not inspect a packet the does not belong to it 
int s = hdrip->src_.addr_ »  Address::instance().NodeShift_[1]; 
int d = hdrip->dst_.addr_ >> Address::instance().NodeShift_[1]; 
double now =Scheduler::instance().clock(); 
double rtt = (now - hdr->send_time) * 1000;
//jitter delay
const double response_delay = .640;
//RNG rdelay;
if (s == this->here_.addr_) {
// Discard the packet its a loop
cerr << sim_mode_Str << "("<< this->here_. a d d r _ « " ) "<<"a
loop\n";
} else if (d == this->here_.addr_ && hdr->ret == 1){
// This packet is addressed to me and it has a respose for my request 
/ / s o  add it to the cache manager
shareCache->addShare(hdr->cert_id , hdr->share_id); 
if(shareCache->find(hdr->cert_id,COMPLETE_CERT) || hdr- 
>share_id == COMPLETE_CERT) {
Fig. 26. CACMAN X-Rep CREP implementation.
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//fill it as we got 't' shares 




//this to show how many replies has been acctually collected 
certCache_[hdr->send_time].insert(hdr->share_id);
} ;
//prepare output to trace file
ost << sim_mode_Str <<" « n o w «  " Node("<<this- 
>here .addr_«") from ("<<s<<") to ("<<d<<") CREP for request# ("<<hdr- 
>send_time<<") cert("<<hdr->cert_id <<") r tt("<<rtt<<")
("«certCache_ [hdr->send_time] . size () <<" out of "<<threshold<<") " ; 
ost.put(0) ; 
trace ("%s",ost.str () .c_str ()); 
ost.str ("");
} else if (d == this->here_.addr_ && hdr->ret == 0){
//I've been asked directly
set<int> pool = shareCache->findAll(hdr->cert_id);
//send all my records about this cert 
if (!pool.empty()) {
//send only one 
int foo = 0;
for (set<int>::iterator it = pool.begin() ; it != 
pool.endO && foo < 1; ++it, foo++) {
if (verbose && 1) cerr << sim_mode_Str«"
Node ("<<this->here_.addr_«") cache hit for c("«hdr- 
>cert_id<<","<<*it<<")\n" ;
ost<<sim_mode_Str<<" Node("<<this- 
>here_.addr_<<") from ("<<s«") to ( " «  d «  ") CREP for request# (" «  
hdr->send_time << ") send cert(" «hdr->cert_id«" , " < < * i t « " ) " ;
ost.p u t (0) ;
trace ("%s",ost.str() .c_str()) ; 
ost.s tr("");
// Create a new packet 
Packet *spkt = allocpkt ();
// Access the Cacman header for the new packet: 
hdr_cacman *shdr = hdr_cacman::access (spkt); 
//set response 
shdr->ret = 1;
// Store the current time in the 'send_time' field 
shdr->send_time = hdr->send_time;
// put the cert rep we have 
shdr->cert_id = hdr->cert_id;//cert; 
shdr->share_id = *it;
hdr_ip *hdrretrip = hdr_ip::access (spkt); 
hdrretrip->dst_.addr_ = s;
hdrretrip->src_.addr_ = this->here_.addr_; 
hdrretrip->dport() = hdrretrip->sport ();
// Send the packet 
send (spkt, 0);








} else if (d >= ALLJSERVERS || d == IP_BROADCAST){
//this is a flood or all servers request check if I can help 
if (reqs.find(hdr->send_time) == reqs.endO && rng.uniform(l.0)
> 0.0) {
//handle duplicate requests, this request has not seend before 
//remember it
reqs.insert(hdr->send_time);
set<int> pool = shareCache->findAll(hdr->cert_id); 
int share = -2; //any neg number except -1 is fine 
//How many reps (51) means X-Rep-All 
for (int i=0;i<51;i++) {
if (!pool.empty()) {
if (pool. find (-1) != pool.endO) {
share = COMPLETE_CERT;
} else {
int random_pos = rng.uniform((int)p o o l .size()); 
//bad way to do it! but this seems the only way 
set<int>::iterator it = pool.begin(); 
for (int i=0 ;i < random_pos; i++) 
it++; 
share = *it; 
pool.erase(share) ;
}
ost«sim_mode_Str<<" Node ("«this- 
>here_.addr_<<") from ( " « s « " )  to ("<< d << ") CREP for request# (" << 




// Create a new packet 
Packet *spkt = allocpkt ();
// Access the Cacman header for the new packet: 
hdr_cacman *shdr = hdr_cacman::access (spkt); 
//set response 
shdr->ret = 1;
// Store the current time in the 'send_time' field 
shdr->send_time = hdr->send_time;
// put the cert we have 
shdr->cert_id = hdr->cert_id;//cert; 
shdr->share_id = share;
hdr_ip *hdrretrip = hdr_ip::access (spkt); 
hdrretrip->dst_.addr_ = s;
hdrretrip->src_.addr_ = this->here_.addr_; 
hdrretrip->dport() = hdrretrip->sport ();
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//we need to send the complete cert once! 




// to be completed 
//if (verbose)
cerr << sim_mode_Str «  this->here__.addr_ <<" This packet is not 
addressed to me but I'm having it s="<<s<<" d="<<d<<"\n" ;
} ;
//at last! done from the packet 
Packet::free (pkt);
Fig. 26. Continued.




T a b l e  X
Im p o r t a n t  a c r o n y m s  u s e d  in  t h e  t h e s is  a n d  t h e ir  m e a n in g s
| Acronym Meaning |
AO Adjusted Overhead 1
AODV Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 1
CA Certificate Authority 1
COCA Cornell Certificate Authority
CREP Certificate Reply
CREQ Certificate Request
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DSR Dynamic Source Routing
FOR Flooding overhead per request
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network
MOCA Mobile Certificate Authority
NS Network Simulator
PGP Pretty Good Privacy
PKI Public-Key Infrastructure
POSR Packet overhead per successful request
PSS Proactive Secret Sharing
URSA Ubiquitous and Robust Access Control for Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
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